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The Fox in the Henhouse: The Failure of the
Video Game Industry’s Self-Regulation with
Regard to Loot Boxes
Carl C. Jones
INTRODUCTION
You are shopping for a loved one. Perhaps the holidays are
approaching, or a birthday draws near, or perhaps you simply
wish to show your affection by making a gift out of the blue. Your
loved one enjoys video games, so you stop by your local big-box
store and the clerk directs you to a glass-paneled shelf, stacked to
the ceiling with games in bright neon boxes. You peruse the
offerings and ask for the clerk to withdraw a few samples. You
note their titles and prices and consider your loved one’s tastes. A
clear favorite emerges. Almost as an afterthought, you check the
game’s rating, noting the stark black-and-white box in the lower
left-hand corner of the cover: “E10+.” An appended note makes
the statement a little clearer: “Everyone 10+.”
You’ve seen these eye-catching labels before; they’re on
virtually every video game you can think of. Out of curiosity you
flip the game over, consulting the more detailed rating guide on
the back side of the box, in the lower right-hand corner. In plain
black text the rating guide cites “Cartoon Violence” and “Comic
Mischief” to support the ten-and-up rating. That’s all well and
good, you think to yourself; comic mischief never seriously hurt
anyone. Then something else catches your eye, in a narrower box
beneath the rating guide: “In-Game Purchases.”
What on earth does that mean?
You decide you will figure that out later. You purchase the
game, along with some handsome gift-wrapping. Later, at home,
you resume your inquiry. The ratings guide says “ESRB,” so you
run a quick internet search and stumble across the
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Entertainment Software Ratings Board’s website.1 The
organization’s “About” page lays out its mission statement
against an attractive backdrop depicting a city skyline at
dusk: “We are the non-profit, self-regulatory body for the video
game industry. Established in 1994, our primary responsibility is
to help consumers – especially parents – make informed choices
about the games their families play.”2 Somewhat relieved, you
consult the ESRB’s webpage detailing the in-game purchases
label. It explains that “microtransactions” are “[s]maller in-game
purchases” that “typically augment or personalize the content of
a game.”3 The webpage further lists “the key types of in-game
microtransactions,”4 including a term you may not have heard
before: “loot boxes.”5
The ESRB defines loot boxes as follows:
“Loot boxes” or “loot crates” are like locked treasure chests that
contain an array of virtual items that can be used in the game once
unlocked. In some games loot boxes can be earned through gameplay
and/or can be purchased using either real money or in-game currency.
In most cases, you can’t see the items before you make the purchase.6

You may not remember loot boxes appearing in the games
you used to play, and the fact that the contents of a loot box are
generally unknown before they are purchased may trouble you. If
so, you’re not alone.7
Loot boxes and other microtransactions represent an
opportunity for the video game industry (the “Industry”) to
monetize particular video game titles for a far longer

1 ESRB, https://www.esrb.org/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2020) [http://perma.cc/L55PRYM5].
2 About ESRB, ESRB, https://www.esrb.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2020)
[http://perma.cc/PAN2-UT2G].
3 Patricia E. Vance, What Parents Need to Know About Loot Boxes (and Other InGame Purchases), ESRB (July 24, 2019), https://www.esrb.org/blog/what-parents-need-toknow-about-loot-boxes-and-other-in-game-purchases/ [http://perma.cc/5DBB-BBA9].
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 See, e.g., Ben Johnson, Loot Boxes Are a Lucrative Game Of Chance, But Are They
Gambling?, NPR (Oct. 10, 2019, 5:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/10/769044790/lootboxes-are-a-lucrative-game-of-chance-but-are-they-gambling [http://perma.cc/S8QS-4WEN];
David Zendle & Paul Cairns, Video Game Loot Boxes are Linked to Problem Gambling:
Results
of
a
Large-Scale
Survey,
PLOS
ONE
(Nov.
21,
2018),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0206767
[http://perma.cc/333Y-XN33]; Mattha Busby, Loot Boxes Increasingly Common in Video
Games Despite Addiction Concerns, GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2019, 5:51 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/games/2019/nov/22/loot-boxes-increasingly-common-in-videogames-despite-addiction-concerns [http://perma.cc/LEQ2-9LPW]; How My Son Went from
Gamer to Compulsive Gambler, BBC (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/stories49941610 [http://perma.cc/F2D9-BU2H].
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post-initial-release period than previously possible.8 Loot boxes
are particularly lucrative: current estimates project that “total
spending on loot boxes and skin gambling is forecast to go up to
$50 billion by 2022.”9 Yet even as loot boxes promise the Industry
tremendous profit,10 players have pilloried them11 and consumer
advocates have raised concerns about their alleged predatory
tactics.12
This Article seeks to distill the broad cultural and legal
conversations about loot boxes in the United States into a
coherent summary. Part I presents the history of loot boxes by
examining Industry-wide changes in the monetization and
development of video games over the past several decades. Part
II addresses the alleged financial and psychological costs that
loot boxes impose upon consumers by reviewing scientific studies
and mainstream reporting on the topic. Part III evaluates the
present controversy over whether loot boxes are a type of
gambling, analyzing traditional gambling definitions and
critiquing existing Industry arguments to the contrary. Part IV
reviews existing self-regulatory measures imposed by the ESRB.
Part V presents arguments for and against continued Industry
self-regulation. Part VI explores possible regulatory solutions,
and the identities of the entities, legislatures, or agencies best
equipped to implement them.
This Article argues that loot boxes are legally equivalent to
gambling. Although others have evaluated whether loot boxes
run afoul of current gambling laws, and most have determined
that courts are unlikely to find sufficient value in a loot box
transaction,13 this Article comes to the opposite conclusion: that
existing case and statutory law is sufficient for a court to
8 FED. TRADE COMM’N, INSIDE THE GAME: UNLOCKING THE CONSUMER ISSUES
SURROUNDING LOOT BOXES, 57–59 (2019) [hereinafter INSIDE THE GAME] (transcript
downloadable at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/inside-game-unlockingconsumer-issues-surrounding-loot-boxes) [http://perma.cc/R5CM-3K26].
9 Id. at 58.
10 See Loot Boxes & Skins Gambling to Generate a $50 Billion Industry by 2022,
JUNIPER RSCH. (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.juniperresearch.com/press/press-releases/lootboxes-and-skins-gambling [http://perma.cc/XRT6-HGLZ].
11 See, e.g., Matthew Gault, Gamers Can’t Stop Buying the Loot Boxes They Hate,
VICE (Oct. 9, 2017, 10:42 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/8x8jq4/gamers-cantstop-buying-the-loot-boxes-they-hate [http://perma.cc/JB5U-5JBV].
12 See, e.g., INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 9 (remarks of Andrew Smith, Director
of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Prot.).
13 See, e.g., Alexander Mann, Pseudo-Gambling and Whaling: How Loot Boxes Prey
on Vulnerable Populations and How to Curtail Future Predatory Behavior, 15 WASH. J.L.
TECH. & ARTS 200, 225 (2020) (observing that “[T]he prizes for loot boxes do not carry any
market value.”). But see Edwin Hong, Loot Boxes: Gambling for the Next Generation, 46
W. ST. U. L. REV. 61, 68 (2019) (“These loot boxes constitute an illegal lottery because in
each case, there is a prize, distribution by random change, and consideration. Therefore,
they should be regulated as a form of gambling under California law.”).
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conclude that loot boxes can have value. This Article engages
with and critically analyzes the Industry’s arguments against
such a designation. Additionally, it argues that, even if loot boxes
do not rise to the level of gambling as it is traditionally
understood, their economic, social, and mental health costs
warrant regulation nevertheless as a novel area of law.
Unlike the present literature, this Article takes a dim view of the
Industry’s arguments for self-regulation, concluding that external
regulation is preferable to continued Industry self-regulation under
the ESRB. It further argues that the Industry’s failure to
acknowledge the merits of gambling comparisons, coupled with its
repeated reliance on tired and discredited arguments in the face of
studies to the contrary, amounts to bad faith conduct. Throughout,
this Article advances the legal discussion surrounding loot boxes by
analyzing the transcript of a 2019 Federal Trade Commission
workshop14 where members of the Industry, academics, and
consumer advocates made their latest arguments in light of the most
recent research. Finally, this Article advocates for the use of
individual limit-setting, in conjunction with transparent pricing and
odds disclosures, as mechanisms to rein in uninformed and
compulsive consumer spending on loot boxes.
I. THE HISTORY OF LOOT BOXES
Loot boxes are a relatively new innovation in the Industry. 15
Historically, video games were produced in a “developer-centric”
business model, where individual games were envisioned,
developed, and ultimately released as standalone titles by their
developers, who “put it out there and hope[d] [it was] a hit.”16
From a business standpoint, a game’s success was measured by
the total number of units sold.17 That emphasis has since shifted
toward a focus on a game’s “lifetime value.”18 Where games were
previously static products, unchanging after being shipped 19
(much like a movie), a new “player-centric” era has begun, in
which the development of “games are being driven by feedback
from gameplay itself, from attention paid by publishers and
developers to the chatter around these games online. And then
they . . . [use] that to iterate on the game after it’s already been

INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8.
See Andrew E. Freedman, What Are Loot Boxes? Gaming’s Big Controversy
Explained, TOM’S GUIDE (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.tomsguide.com/us/what-are-lootboxes-microtransactions,news-26161.html [http://perma.cc/E3C9-25MH].
16 INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 57.
17 Id. at 58.
18 Id.
19 See id.
14
15
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shipped.”20 In calculating a game’s lifetime value, stakeholders
examine “not only how much [consumers] pay to acquire the
game . . . but [also] how much value is delivered over the life of
the game through things like microtransactions.”21 Such profit
windows “are measured in years, not months.”22
The first commercial home video game system, the Odyssey,
was marketed by Magnavox and sold in 1972.23 Over the ensuing
decades, video games have grown into “a $100 billion global
industry, and nearly two-thirds of American homes have
household members who play video games regularly.”24 Video
games are now available across multiple “platforms,” such as
personal computers (“PCs”), modern video game consoles, and
mobile phones.25 Through the 1990s and into the dawn of the new
century, the Industry derived most of its revenue from selling
individual, self-contained products to consumers, their ultimate
end-users.26 While these products originally took the form of
tangible goods, such as cartridges and discs, the advent of the
Internet allowed for games to be distributed via digital
downloads.27 Even at that time, the business of buying a video
game still resembled most consumer transactions for the
purchase and sale of goods: consumers bought a copy of a video
game outright (as one might a book or DVD), or in the case of
some online games, purchased a license to play.28 Video games were
sold as complete, finished products.29 As the Industry moved further
into the new decade, “monetisation in video games underwent a
significant shift,” with a growing emphasis on the sale of
supplemental digital products to augment the gameplay experience:
microtransactions.30 While some microtransactions made mere
cosmetic changes to a game, others granted players “in-game
advantages.”31 In both instances, these supplemental products were
available
for
direct
purchase
for
a
set
price. 32
Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 58.
Id.
23 Video Game History, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/inventions/historyof-video-games [http://perma.cc/73P5-PM6G] (last updated June 10, 2019).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 David Zendle et al., The Changing Face of Desktop Video Game Monetization: An
Exploration of Trends in Loot Boxes, Pay to Win, and Cosmetic Microtransactions in the
Most-Played Steam Games of 2010-2019, PSYARXIV PREPRINTS 3 (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://psyarxiv.com/u35kt [http://perma.cc/TGA7-C4SD].
27 See id.
28 Id.
29 See id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See id.
20
21
22
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By 2006, however, the practice evolved, and some of the earliest loot
boxes appeared in ZT Online, a Chinese massively-multiplayer
online game (“MMO”).33 Loot boxes, unlike their direct-purchase
predecessors, added “an element of randomisation” to the process of
making a video game microtransaction.34 Now, if a player wished to
receive a specific virtual item and that item happened to be
distributed via a loot box system, she could not simply purchase
that item directly as before; she would have to open one or more loot
boxes, until she received the item she desired or she gave up her
search.35
Today, loot boxes often appear in so-called free-to-play (F2P)
games, which do not charge an up-front purchase price to begin
playing.36 Industry advocates have often justified the inclusion of
loot boxes and other microtransactions in such games by noting
the high cost of developing a video game,37 as well as the freedom
these delayed costs afford players to try out these free-to-play
games before making a financial commitment. 38 However, over
the past decade, and in particular since the release of Activision
Blizzard’s Overwatch in 2016,39 loot boxes have been increasingly
adopted as an alternative revenue stream by video game
developers and publishers, and have been featured in many
modern-day video games across platforms and genres.40 They
have appeared in triple-A titles sold in retail and digital stores
for a sticker price,41 as well as free-to-play games available over
the internet, whether accessible through personal computers or
mobile devices.42 At present, loot boxes represent a $30 billion
industry, an amount projected to rise to $50 billion by 2022.43
Because loot boxes require players who seek a particular
digital item to pay money, often without any guarantee of
receiving the item they desire, critics have likened the process to
gambling.44 Some countries have since passed laws regulating
loot boxes by mandating disclosure of the odds of receiving
33 Steven T. Wright, The Evolution of Loot Boxes, PC GAMER (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://www.pcgamer.com/the-evolution-of-loot-boxes/ [http://perma.cc/VQ89-ESDF].
34 Zendle, supra note 26, at 3.
35 See id.
36 See Makena Kelly, How Loot Boxes Hooked Gamers and Left Regulators Spinning,
VERGE (Feb. 19, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/19/18226852/lootboxes-gaming-regulation-gambling-free-to-play [http://perma.cc/9X3H-PDBG].
37 See id.
38 INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 26 (remarks of Sean Kane).
39 Freedman, supra note 15.
40 See Kelly, supra note 36.
41 Id.
42 See id.
43 JUNIPER RSCH., supra note 10.
44 See,
e.g.,
What
Are
Loot
Boxes?,
PARENT
ZONE,
https://parentzone.org.uk/article/what-are-loot-boxes [http://perma.cc/G48K-VSJG].
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specific virtual items;45 others have banned the practice
outright.46 The United States has yet to take significant
regulatory action against loot boxes,47 and the Entertainment
Software Association (“ESA,” the parent entity of the ESRB48)
has announced its opinion that loot boxes categorically do not
constitute gambling.49
However, players,50 consumer advocates,51 and politicians52
continue to voice their concerns about the practice. Academics have
begun to examine the psychology driving loot box purchases; an
empirical study has noted links between loot box purchases and
problem gambling behavior.53 The federal government has also
begun to take note; in August of 2019, the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) hosted a conference to hear the opinions of players, Industry
associations, attorneys, consumer advocates, and academic
researchers.54 The future of regulatory action against loot boxes in
the United States is far from certain, and the present status quo
grants the ESRB broad self-regulatory oversight over its member
entities’ activities.55 Yet calls for enhanced regulation have not
abated, and the precise mechanisms for direct government oversight
remain uncharted.

45 T.J. Hafer, The Legal Status of Loot Boxes Around the World, and What’s Next in
the Debate, PC GAMER (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.pcgamer.com/the-legal-status-of-lootboxes-around-the-world-and-whats-next/ [http://perma.cc/ZW4J-WJ32].
46 Gaming Loot Boxes: What Happened When Belgium Banned Them?, BBC (Sept.
12, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-49674333 [http://perma.cc/5QZA-4UW4].
47 See Makena Kelly, Game Studios Would Be Banned from Selling Loot Boxes to
Minors
Under
New
Bill,
VERGE
(May
8,
2019,
12:00
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/8/18536806/game-studios-banned-loot-boxes-minors-billhawley-josh-blizzard-ea [http://perma.cc/9965-3YSU].
48 Our History, ESRB, https://www.esrb.org/history/ (last visited May 3, 2020)
[http://perma.cc/JW6Q-CS2W].
49 See Paul Tassi, The ESRB Is Being Willfully Obtuse About Loot Boxes, And Will
Never
Be
Any
Help,
FORBES
(Feb.
28,
2018,
9:25
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2018/02/28/the-esrb-is-being-willfully-obtuse-aboutloot-boxes-and-will-never-be-any-help/#1959c0b76877 [http://perma.cc/8P5A-G47R].
50 See, e.g., Will Fulton, Do Players Really Like Loot Boxes, or are Game Publishers Forcing
Them on Us?, DIGITAL TRENDS (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.digitaltrends.com/gaming/do-playerslike-loot-boxes/ [http://perma.cc/2K26-U72V].
51 See, e.g., INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 33 (remarks of Jeff Haynes, Senior
Editor of Video Games, Common Sense Media).
52 See, e.g., Chris Lee, Highlights of the Predatory Gaming Announcement, YOU TUBE
(Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_akwfRuL4os [http://perma.cc/83QR477F].
53 Zendle & Cairns, supra note 7.
54 INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 10–11 (remarks of Andrew Smith, Director,
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection).
55 See ESRB Introduces New Rating Process for Console Downloadable Video Games,
ESRB (Apr. 18, 2011), https://www.esrb.org/blog/esrb-introduces-new-rating-process-forconsole-downloadable-video-games/ [http://perma.cc/2NPY-DETF] (featuring ESRB
President’s claim that “Our rating system is widely considered to be among the most
effective in the world, and ESRB continues to be an exemplary model of self-regulation.”).
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II. THE FINANCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COSTS OF LOOT BOXES
Ordinary consumers are bearing real psychological and
financial costs as a result of the increased implementation of loot
boxes.56 Mainstream reporting on the rise of loot boxes is replete
with personal vignettes from parents discovering that their
young children are being enticed to spend the equivalent of
hundreds or thousands of dollars on loot boxes to chase desired
items.57 However, children are not the only players affected;
spouses and parents have also suffered familial strain as a result
of their own compulsive spending on loot boxes.58 Writing about
his loot box spending habits, one parent wrote, “I am currently
$15,800 in debt. My wife no longer trusts me. My kids, who ask
me why I am playing Final Fantasy all the time, will never
understand how I selfishly spent money I should have been using
for their activities.”59 Perhaps even more sobering are the stories
of young adults who were introduced to the world of online
gambling through loot boxes featured in sports games.60 Studies
have noted that, on average, where non-problem gamblers spend
only $2.50 on loot boxes every month, problem gamblers spend
$25.61
As one author noted, the video game “industry is certainly no
stranger to moral panics and appeals to the judicial and
legislative systems.”62 It is clear that regulations should not be
haphazardly foisted upon an industry based upon scattered and
anecdotal reports, in particular an industry as susceptible to
public outrage and demonization as the video game industry, a
trend just as common today63 as it was at the Industry’s
inception.64 The revenue derived from loot boxes serves a
56 See, e.g., Mattha Busby, ‘Easy Trap to Fall Into’: Why Video-Game Loot Boxes
Need
Regulation,
GUARDIAN
(May
29,
2018,
1:50
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/games/2018/may/29/gamers-politicians-regulation-videogame-loot-boxes [http://perma.cc/NP62-Z45S].
57 See, e.g., Kate Jackson, The Great Game Robbery: How Kids are Racking Up Bills
Worth Thousands Buying ‘Loot Boxes’ on Games Like Fifa and Minecraft, THE SUN (Oct.
22, 2019, 10:30 PM), https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/10192098/games-bill-loot-boxes/
[http://perma.cc/F9LD-YLN5].
58 See, e.g., Busby, supra note 56.
59 Id. (emphasis of game title added).
60 See How My Son Went from Gamer to Compulsive Gambler, supra note 7.
61 Aaron Drummond et al., Loot Box Limit-Setting: A Potential Policy to Protect
Video Game Users with Gambling Problems?, 114 ADDICTION 935, 935 (2019).
62 David J. Castillo, Unpacking the Loot Box: How Gaming’s Latest Monetization
System Flirts with Traditional Grambling Methods, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 165, 175
(2019).
63 See, e.g., Lisette Voytko, Trump Suggests Video Games Connected to Violence:
Research
Doesn’t
Support
That,
FORBES
(Aug.
5,
2019,
12:34
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lisettevoytko/2019/08/05/trump-blames-video-games-forshootings-but-research-doesnt-support-that/#7c58d92611dc [http://perma.cc/NZ8P-JSNL].
64 See, e.g., Stacie Ponder, 25 Years Later, ‘Disgusting’ Night Trap is Incredibly
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meaningful purpose: Industry advocates have justified the
inclusion of loot boxes in games by noting that they help to offset
rising development costs65 and stagnant, or even falling, video
game prices.66
One of the strongest arguments in favor of loot box
implementation is that it enables players to choose how much
they wish to financially support a particular game.67 At the 2019
FTC conference, Mike Warnecke of the ESA noted, “[W]hen
people experience games, they want to be able to kick the tires on
it and not . . . [buy] something until they have a chance to
experience it. . . . [Y]ou have the chance to expand the content if
you decide to like it.”68 Loot boxes undoubtedly allow players to
vary their level of financial support for a particular game, and
are not mandatory to progress in most, if not all, games that
feature them.69 Indeed, Industry advocates frequently tout
players’ choice and autonomy in deciding whether or not to buy
loot boxes.70
It is undeniable that loot boxes make modern-day games
profitable for publishers71 and accessible to players who
cannot—or will not—pay anything to play.72 But one cannot
ignore the impact the practice has on vulnerable individuals, who
are suffering real-world financial and psychological costs
associated with the increased implementation of loot boxes in
modern video games. While legal and political decision-makers
may ultimately decide to endorse the practice, the decision
should not be made lightly or without confronting the human
costs.
A Vice author sought out the opinions of individuals on the
subject, writing:
I opened myself to a broad spectrum of stories and experiences. The
individuals I spoke to ran a wide gamut of gaming contexts and age
groups. They played across multiple platforms, from mobile to PC and
console. Generally, these individuals had problems with one specific
game rather than a problem spread across multiple titles. I did not
observe a line between cosmetic economies, such as Overwatch, and
economies that influence progression such as Battlefront II and

Tame, KOTAKU (Aug. 15, 2017, 2:30 PM), https://kotaku.com/25-years-later-disgustingnight-trap-is-incredibly-tam-1797864067 [http://perma.cc/9JGW-JTH6].
65 INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 25–26 (remarks of Sean Kane).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 26.
68 Id. at 45–46.
69 Id. at 46.
70 E.g., id. at 26, 46.
71 Id. at 59 (remarks of John Breyault).
72 See id. at 26 (remarks of Sean Kane).
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Shadow of Mordor. The strongest common thread in all of these
stories was a similar set of behaviors and impacts. The people I spoke
to by-and-large described their spending on loot boxes as impulsive,
shameful, and stress-inducing.73

This description of loot boxes cuts against the Industry’s
well-established narrative that players choose to purchase loot
boxes as part of an informed process. 74 One Industry advocate
claimed, “No one is forced to spend money in a video game that is
free to play. They choose what they want to spend and when they
want to spend it and how they want to spend it.”75 But those
words are difficult to reconcile with those of an affected player,
who has spent several hundreds of dollars on loot boxes, who
wrote:
I felt compelled to spend on loot boxes every time a limited time event
started so I wouldn’t miss out. . . . It warped my whole perception of
the game into short periods of anxiety and stress where I had to spend
money or play constantly on the hope of not missing out.76

The harm inflicted by compulsive loot box spending goes
beyond mere embarrassment. Affected individuals have reported
intense feelings of shame and self-loathing.77 In a particularly
chilling example, one correspondent in the Vice article confessed,
“I ended up calling a suicide hotline that night. I felt distraught,
pathetic, that I had just blown so much money on nothing but
virtual jewels. I felt like I deserved to die for letting it get so bad
and for wasting this much money.”78
These players’ experiences are anything but unique,79 and
language of compulsion and anxiety dominates first-hand player
discussion of their encounters with loot boxes.80 It may be easy to
73 Ellen McGrody, For Many Players, Lootboxes are a Crisis That’s Already Here,
VICE (Jan. 30, 2018, 11:08 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/kznmwa/for-manyplayers-lootboxes-are-a-crisis-thats-already-here [http://perma.cc/UD6V-SGKA].
74 See, e.g., INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 26.
75 Id.
76 McGrody, supra note 73.
77 See id.
78 Id.
79 See, e.g., Ethan Gach, Meet the 19-Year-Old Who Spent Over $17,000 on
Microtransactions,
KOTAKU
(Nov.
30,
2017,
10:00
AM),
https://www.kotaku.com.au/2017/11/meet-the-19-year-old-who-spent-over-17000-onmicrotransactions/ [http://perma.cc/SB94-FSPM]; Mike Wright, Children Spending £250
on Fortnite ‘Skins’ to Avoid Being Labelled ‘The Poor Kid’ at School, Children’s
Commissioner
Warns,
TELEGRAPH
(Oct.
22,
2019,
12:01
AM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/10/21/children-spending-250-fortnite-skins-avoidlabeled-poor-kid/ [http://perma.cc/VYA2-6LNJ]; Zoe Kleinman, ‘My Son Spent £3,160 in
One Game’, BBC (July 15, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48925623
[http://perma.cc/N8H3-VS9P].
80 See, e.g., Alysia Judge, Video Games and Mental Health: ‘Nobody’s Properly
Talking’, BBC (July 14, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-44662669
[http://perma.cc/SQ2V-6UFM].
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assume that such players are the exception, and that a few
individuals with problematic gambling behaviors are simply
making imprudent decisions, but that claim is far from reality. 81
It has become clear in academic circles that there is a
statistically-significant correlation between loot box spending
and problem gambling activity.82 Doctors David Zendle and Paul
Cairns conducted a large-scale survey of video game players in
order to evaluate the connection between these two behaviors. 83
The results of their research were sobering:
This research provides empirical evidence of a relationship between
loot box use and problem gambling. The relationship seen here was
neither small, nor trivial. It was stronger than previously observed
relationships between problem gambling and factors like alcohol
abuse, drug use, and depression. Indeed, sub-group analyses revealed
that an individual’s classification as either a non problem gambler or
a problem gambler accounted for 37.7% of the variance in how much
they spent on loot boxes. These results may confirm the existence of
the causal relationship between buying loot boxes and problem
gambling . . . . Due to the formal features that loot boxes share with
other forms of gambling, they may well be acting as a ‘gateway’ to
problem gambling amongst gamers. Hence, the more gamers spend on
loot boxes, the more severe their problem gambling becomes.84

They were quick to point out a significant caveat: “However,
it is important to note that this is not the only causal
relationship which fits the data. It may be the case that
individuals who are already problem gamblers instead tend to
spend more on loot boxes.”85 Uncertain of which way the causal
arrow pointed, the authors posited:
It may, indeed be the case that both directions of causality are true:
Problem gamblers spend more on loot boxes, whilst buying loot boxes
simultaneously leads to increases in problem gambling amongst
gamers. However, regardless of which of these outcomes is the case,
this research bears an important message when it comes to the
regulation of loot boxes within the gaming industry. . . . It may be the
case that this spending is leading to problem gambling. It may be that
this level of spending is driven by pre-existing problem gambling
amongst gamers. . . . However, in either case, this research provides
industry bodies such as the ESRB with crucial evidence to use when
determining whether there is still insufficient evidence of links between
problem gambling and loot box use.86

81
82
83
84
85
86

See Zendle & Cairns, supra note 7.
Id. at 1, 3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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This research illustrates a quantifiable connection between
loot box spending and problem gambling behavior,87 providing
academic support for the notion that loot boxes exploit or impose
real psychological harm on a very real population of consumers.
Finally, the authors of the study looked beyond the legal
roadblocks to implementing loot box regulations and couched the
matter in human terms:
This study shows a relationship between loot box spending and
problem gambling. . . . Furthermore, we believe that the strength of
the relationship that was observed here between problem gambling
and loot box spending suggests that important gambling-related harm
is experienced by users of loot boxes. We strongly recommend that
relevant national and federal regulatory authorities consider
restricting access to loot boxes as if they were a form of gambling. . . .
It is our opinion that this relationship remains serious and potentially
dangerous regardless of whether loot boxes are technically considered a
form of gambling or not.88

While it is unclear whether loot boxes’ presence in video
games first exposes individuals to further gambling-related
harm, or merely exploits the existing problematic gambling
tendencies of a subset of players, neither result can be considered
trivial. Under both models, the Industry profits off of vulnerable
individuals, whether it creates that vulnerability or merely
exploits it. Further, the Industry is aware of, and indeed relies
upon, the revenue derived from those individuals.89
In writing on the topic of habit-forming design in phone
applications and video games, Associate Professor Kyle
Langvardt discussed the incentives developers have to maximize
user “time on device,” both from an advertising and a
microtransactional approach.90 He found that, while the majority
of players pay little into microtransaction-heavy free-to-play
games,91 “most revenue from micropayments is highly
concentrated among a small group of apparent addicts who
individually spend thousands of dollars on in-app purchases.”92
Professor Langvardt further illustrated the problematic behavior
of heavy spenders, indicating that “0.15 percent of mobile gamers
account for 50 percent of the industry’s revenue from
micropayments. About 1.9 percent make up 90 percent of
Id. at 3.
Id. at 9–10 (emphasis added).
See Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Habit-Forming Technology, 88 FORDHAM L. REV.
129, 140 (2019).
90 Id. at 134–46.
91 Id. at 140.
92 Id. (internal citations omitted).
87
88
89

Do Not Delete

2020]

5/17/2021 8:44 AM

The Fox in the Henhouse

257

revenue.”93 He noted that the Industry refers to such players as
“whales,” and recognize whales as one of their primary revenue
streams in games of this kind.94 Indeed, Professor Langvardt
hypothesized that the “unbalanced” rate at which whale and
non-whale players paid into certain games “may give game
developers strong incentives to encourage addiction-driven,
whale-like purchases.”95
Ultimately, Professor Langvardt concluded that habit-forming
design poses “at least three types of harm: addiction, strain on social
norms, and degradation of public discourse.”96 He discussed the
relatively small population of individuals suffering from the World
Health Organization-recognized “problem gaming disorder,”97 and
likened the demographic trend to “the gambling industry, where only
a small percentage of the population develops a serious habit.”98 This
demonstrates that, as in the gambling industry, loot boxes can pose
serious harms to individuals, even if the majority of people engaging
in the activity walk away relatively unscathed.
The Industry’s leadership in recognizing these harms has
been sorely lacking.99 Professor Langvardt noted that “Industry
leaders in both the tech and gambling sectors emphasize the
behavioral nature of the problem, and they suggest that they are
not responsible for the small minority’s problems with impulse
control.”100 This moralizing disavowal of responsibility fails to
account for the fact that, behind the scenes, the Industry relies
heavily on such vulnerable individuals in monetizing its
products.101 Professor Langvardt remarked, “Developers have
strong incentives to drive problem use, just as casinos do, and
they make every effort to do so.”102

Id.
Id.
95 Id. at 141.
96 Id. at 146.
97 Id.
98 Id.; see also Ferris Jabr, Can You Really be Addicted to Video Games?, N.Y TIMES
(Oct.
22,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/magazine/can-you-really-beaddicted-to-video-games.html [http://perma.cc/JLL8-FM9U].
99 Langvardt, supra note 89, at 146.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 140–41; see also PocketGamerbiz, Let’s Go Whaling: Tricks for Monetising
Mobile
Game
Players
with
Free-to-Play,
YOUTUBE
(Oct.
3,
2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xNjI03CGkb4&ab_channel=PocketGamerbiz
[http://perma.cc/LGZ5-UERR] (depicting CEO of a developer speaking at a conference,
describing his presentation, entitled “Let’s go Whaling!,” as follows: “It is about a
summary of a huge bunch of behavioral psychology, so the tricks on how to monetize a
game well. Some of you will probably be slightly shocked by all the tricks I have listed
here, but I’ll leave the morality of it out of the talk, we can discuss it if we have time
later.”).
102 Langvardt, supra note 89, at 147.
93
94
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It is necessary to consider the words of the Industry’s own
representatives in defending these problematic practices.
Speaking at the 2019 FTC workshop, Sean Kane, a
representative of “more than 100 video game companies,”103
attempted to normalize problem users’ heavy spending as a
purely volitional activity, claiming, “I don’t think that we, as an
industry, needs [sic] to step into that parental role, though,
because some of these people are not children. . . . Some of these
people are our age and they’re spending $1,000 on a game that
they love and this is their way of relaxing after a hard day’s
work.”104 It is difficult to characterize these whales’ spending
patterns as knowing purchases, however.
Some game mechanisms cloud just how much a player is
spending on loot boxes and other microtransactions by employing
in-game currencies purchased with real-world money,105 a level of
abstraction that can impede players’ ability to evaluate the
financial consequences of their purchases.106 The Industry
defends the practice of using in-game currencies as one that
helps “to maintain a player’s sense of immersion in the game.”107
In its staff perspective write-up a year after the 2019 FTC
conference, the FTC recognized as one of its “key takeaways” that
in-game currencies “may confuse some players, as it essentially
requires a player to remember the real currency to in-game
currency ‘exchange rate’ and calculate it for every transaction.”108
At the same 2019 FTC conference, a panelist from the
National Consumers League, John Breyault, noted the following
concerning in-game currency:
So I’d like to turn now to a specific issue that we’re looking at, which
is the use of in-game currency. As you’ve heard from the other
panelists, in-game currency has proliferated throughout the top
games. In FIFA, you’ve got FIFA coins. In NBA 2K19, you’ve got VC.
In Overwatch, you’ve got credits. . . . So the currencies obtained via
gameplay or purchase, our concern is that they may obscure the true
cost of purchasing in-game content. So does it actually tell you how

INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 14.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 62–63.
106 Id. at 66–67; see also Brendan Sinclair, Is it Time to Retire Virtual Currency?,
GAMESINDUSTRY (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2019-09-20-isit-time-to-retire-virtual-currency [http://perma.cc/LAU4-LRJZ] (discussing the lubricating
effect in-game currency has on players’ decisions to purchase microtransactions, by
reducing “friction points” and “opportunities for a consumer to consider whether they
really want to spend this money”).
107 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC VIDEO GAME LOOT BOX WORKSHOP: STAFF PERSPECTIVE
4 (2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/staff-perspective-paper-lootbox-workshop/loot_box_workshop_staff_perspective.pdf [http://perma.cc/24CA-EUCZ].
108 Id.
103
104
105
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much you’re spending in real money down the line? . . . When
something’s priced at $1.99, you may not think that this is $2 and be
more likely to spend money on it. . . . The problem here is that when
you combine this with things like these bonuses that are offered here,
it puts a lot of cognitive load on the user, creating a complex exchange
rate between digital money and real dollars. And it can make it easy
to lose track of an object’s real world value.109

The piecemeal nature in which microtransactions, loot boxes
included, extract money from players ultimately causes players
to spend more on a free to play game in total than they would
have likely consented to spend in advance.110 In order to address
the difficulties surrounding in-game currencies, Section VI below
advocates for limit-setting practices as one of several new
regulatory mechanisms to be implemented in video games.
Because of developer incentives to drive problematic use and
because of the absence of a meaningful Industry response in the
face of demonstrated links between loot boxes and problem
gambling behavior, it is patently unwise to defer to the Industry
as a self-regulatory authority. Concerned consumers must look
elsewhere for protection, namely their governments. The function
of a government’s police power is to protect its citizens from
physical harms and perceived social evils.111 The manner and
extent to which that power is exercised is a question of policy and
preference, but its existence cannot be denied.112 There is a
longstanding history in the United States of government
intervention to protect individuals from predatory and harmful
corporate behavior, such as in the decades-long regulatory fight
with the tobacco industry.113 As explained in Section VI below,
government loot box regulation is a viable method to address the
harms discussed thus far, a remedy forestalled only by
misconceptions about the number and type of individuals affected
by loot boxes, as well as disinterest by existing regulatory
authorities. It is clear that loot boxes harm certain individuals,
INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 62–63. (emphasis of game titles added).
See Langvardt, supra note 89, at 135; see also INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 94 (“I
don’t think that simply saying on a box that you have any in-app purchases available
adequately informs your typical parent or consumer just about the level of investment that
goes into trying to get people to spend more on a game or in the app.”); id. at 180 (“It’s very
hard for consumers to know what they’re getting, what it’s going to cost.”).
111 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 8 (2020); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope
of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 430 (2004).
112 See Barnett, supra note 111, at 430.
113 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BANTHIN, TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM,
REGULATING TOBACCO RETAILERS: OPTIONS FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1
(2010); see also Ned Sharpless & Mitch Zeller, Achievements in Tobacco Regulation Over
the
Past
Decade
and
Beyond,
FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fdavoices/achievements-tobacco-regulation-over-past-decade-and-beyond (last updated Aug.
20, 2019) [http://perma.cc/PJX2-TFFY].
109
110
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both financially114 and psychologically.115 As constituents become
better-informed of the pervasiveness and effects of loot boxes,
they can press elected and regulatory officials to take action.
Whether that action can take the form of enforcement under
existing gambling statutes would require a court to find that loot
boxes amounted to a form of gambling, discussed further below.
III. LOOT BOXES AS GAMBLING
The controversy over whether loot boxes are a form of
gambling (“the gambling determination”) continues to rage.116
The Industry’s advocates have been quick to rebut claims to that
effect, seeking to distinguish traditional gambling activity from
the experience of opening a loot box.117 The ESRB, an entity
purporting to serve as a self-regulator the video game industry,
weighed in on the controversy by writing to gaming news source
Kotaku:
ESRB does not consider loot boxes to be gambling. . . . While there’s
an element of chance in these mechanics, the player is always
guaranteed to receive in-game content (even if the player
unfortunately receives something they don’t want). We think of it as a
similar principle to collectible card games: Sometimes you’ll open a
pack and get a brand new holographic card you’ve had your eye on for
a while. But other times you’ll end up with a pack of cards you already
have.118

In evaluating whether to take steps to regulate loot boxes,
states and nations have grappled with this labelling issue.119
Countries that have concluded that loot boxes are not a form of
gambling have not meaningfully regulated them.120 Countries

See, e.g., McGrody, supra note 73.
See, e.g., Zendle & Cairns, supra note 7.
See, e.g., Andrew V. Moshirnia, Precious and Worthless: A Comparative
Perspective on Loot Boxes and Gambling, 20 MINN. J.L. SCI & TECH. 77, 77–78 (2019)
(noting that loot boxes are unlikely to be labeled gambling in the United States, and
advocating instead for “transparency-based” solutions); see also Loot Boxes Are a
Lucrative Game of Chance, But Are They Gambling?, NPR (Oct. 10, 2019, 5:08 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/10/10/769044790/loot-boxes-are-a-lucrative-game-of-chance-butare-they-gambling [http://perma.cc/339C-L4LR]; Hong, supra note 13 at 65–67 (arguing
loot boxes constitute gambling under the California Penal Code, with a particular focus on
protecting minors).
117 Jason Schreier, ESRB Says It Doesn’t See ‘Loot Boxes’ as Gambling, KOTAKU (Oct.
11, 2017, 12:46 PM), https://kotaku.com/esrb-says-it-doesnt-see-loot-boxes-as-gambling1819363091 [http://perma.cc/GJ65-YRFZ].
118 Id.
119 See Alex Hern & Rob Davies, Video Game Loot Boxes Should Be Classed as
Gambling,
Says
Commons,
GUARDIAN
(Sept. 12,
2019,
1:01
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/games/2019/sep/12/video-game-loot-boxes-should-beclassed-as-gambling-says-commons [http://perma.cc/M5RY-Z9YK].
120 See Zoe Kleinman, Fifa Packs and Loot Boxes ‘Not Gambling’ in UK, BBC (July
22, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-49074003 [http://perma.cc/DM5N-UK7S].
114
115
116
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that have come to the opposite conclusion have heavily regulated
or outright banned the practice.121 As a result, the resolution of
this issue one way or the other can have serious financial
ramifications for the Industry.122 While some Industry
spokespeople seek to characterize the gambling comparison as
misinformed,123 it seems imprudent to take their word for it
without further engaging with the issue. Considering that the
governments of multiple nations have found against the ESA’s
position that loot boxes are not a form of gambling,124 the
controversy is a far cry from being neatly resolved.
A.

Defining Gambling
Black’s Law Dictionary defines gambling as “[t]he act of
risking something of value, esp. money, for a chance to win a
prize.”125 While state statutes differ in the precise wording of
their gambling definitions, they all focus on the elements of (1) a
wager of something of value for (2) a valuable prize awarded
through (3) random chance.126 Some statutes directly
acknowledge that not all activities featuring prizes are gambling,
such as contests of skill.127 Regardless of the precise wording of a
particular statute, all traditional gambling activity, by nature,
requires a participant to risk something of value (i.e.
consideration).128 It is only after a participant risks something of
value that they are eligible to win a prize.129 However, as anyone

121 See Tom Gerken, Video Game Loot Boxes Declared Illegal Under Belgium
Gambling Laws, BBC (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43906306
[http://perma.cc/YE7E-NBAW].
122 See, e.g., Alex Hern, Square Enix Pulls Three Games from Belgium After Loot Box
Ban,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
21,
2018,
4:57
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/games/2018/nov/21/square-enix-pulls-games-mobius-finalfantasy-belgium-loot-box-ban [http://perma.cc/H5HA-SAY4]; see also Amrita Khalid,
Nintendo Pulls Two Mobile Games in Belgium Due to Loot Box Laws, ENGADGET (May 21,
2019),
https://www.engadget.com/2019-05-21-nintendo-pulls-two-mobile-games-inbelgium-due-to-loot-box-laws.html
[http://perma.cc/2QFJ-78U5];
Paul
Tassi,
EA
Surrenders in Belgian FIFA Ultimate Team Loot Box Fight, Raising Potential Red Flags,
FORBES (Jan. 29, 2019, 10:23 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2019/01/29/easurrenders-in-belgian-fifa-ultimate-team-loot-box-fight-raising-potential-redflags/#2a4b366d3675 [http://perma.cc/KHX8-74L4].
123 See, e.g., Tae Kim, State Legislators Call EA’s Game a ‘Star Wars-Themed Online
Casino’ Preying on Kids, Vow Action, CNBC (Nov. 22, 2017, 8:57 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/22/state-legislators-call-eas-game-a-star-wars-themedonline-casino-preying-on-kids-vow-action.html [http://perma.cc/VEU2-Y8UH].
124 See Shabana Arif, The Netherlands Starts Enforcing Its Loot Box Ban, IGN (June
20, 2018, 3:07 AM), https://www.ign.com/articles/2018/06/20/the-netherlands-startsenforcing-its-loot-box-ban [http://perma.cc/QU8E-Q2DV]; see also Gerken, supra note 121.
125 Gambling, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
126 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0237 (2005).
127 See id.
128 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 2 (2020).
129 See id.
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passingly familiar with the concept of gambling can attest,
simply being eligible to win does not guarantee that result.
Uncertainty is inherent in all gambling activity.130
However, the definition of gambling in Black’s Law
Dictionary is not sufficient on its own. In order to meaningfully
discuss whether loot boxes are a form of gambling, a baseline
definition must be established.131 While many of the generalized
terms employed in the dictionary definition are reflected time
and again in state gambling laws, their arrangement and
emphasis varies.132 Historically, the federal government has only
stepped in to regulate gambling where it meaningfully
encroaches upon the realm of interstate commerce.133 As a result,
the decision whether and how to regulate gambling has largely
fallen to the respective states, each of which makes its own policy
determination.134 Indeed, the ability to regulate gambling is
perhaps one of the most iconic and well-settled exercises of a
state’s police power.135 As such, we must look to state laws to
begin to define gambling. Some states, like California, regulate
gambling activity broadly.136 In listing the forms of gambling
conduct it prohibits as a misdemeanor, California law provides:
Every person who deals, plays, or carries on, opens, or causes to be
opened, or who conducts, either as owner or employee, whether for
hire or not, any game of faro, monte, roulette, lansquenet, rouge et
noire, rondo, tan, fan-tan, seven-and-a-half, twenty-one, hokey-pokey,
or any banking or percentage game played with cards, dice, or any
device, for money, checks, credit, or other representative of value, and
every person who plays or bets at or against any of those prohibited
games, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punishable by a fine
not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand
dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding
six months, or by both the fine and imprisonment.137

Washington state defines gambling as “staking or risking
something of value upon the outcome of a contest of chance or a
future contingent event not under the person’s control or
influence, upon an agreement or understanding that the person
or someone else will receive something of value in the event of a
certain outcome.”138 Of particular interest is the statute’s focus

130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

See id.
Castillo, supra note 62, at 183.
See, e.g., Castillo, supra note 62, at 183–84.
See Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 344 (1903).
38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 8 (2020).
See 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 8 (2020).
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 330 et seq. (1991).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 330 (1991) (emphasis added).
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0237 (2005).
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on whether the result of the activity is within a purported
gambler’s “control or influence,” and the necessary implication
that activities involving results within a player’s control do not
constitute gambling.139
Other states, perhaps most famously Nevada, embrace
gambling activity by permitting it statewide and reap its
economic benefits as a result.140 Under Nevada law: “‘Gaming’ or
‘gambling’ means to deal, operate, carry on, conduct, maintain or
expose for play any game as defined [by state law], or to operate
an inter-casino linked system.”141 Nevada further defines “Game”
as “any game played with cards, dice, equipment or any
mechanical, electromechanical or electronic device or machine for
money, property, checks, credit or any representative of
value . . . .”142
While some states may elect to enact detailed gambling laws,
state statutes need not define gambling to avoid being
unconstitutionally vague.143 Perhaps as an inevitable result,
states can define the term loosely to suit their needs. It is
therefore necessary to view the broad constellation of state
gambling definitions to determine its common elements.144
Based upon a review of multiple state gambling statutes, one
author advanced the following working gambling definition: “any
activity in which consideration is given in a game of chance in
return for a prize.”145 This Article adopts the same definition for
purposes of discussion and critique. Where other scholarly
articles have examined loot boxes under these elements and
determined that a court would be unlikely to hold their use to be
gambling activity,146 this Article comes to the opposite conclusion.
As argued in detail below, players and game developers treat loot
See id.
See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463.010 et seq. (2019) (also known as the “Nevada
Gaming Control Act,” in which the Nevada Legislature expressly “[found], and declare[d]
to be the public policy of this state, that… the gaming industry is vitally important to the
economy of the State and general welfare of the inhabitants.”)
141 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463.0153 (2019).
142 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463.0152 (2020) (emphasis added).
143 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 1 (2019).
144 Castillo, supra note 62, at 183 (“[B]y examining various state statutes’ definition
of gambling and gambling instruments, a working definition begins to emerge.”).
145 Id. at 184.
146 See id. at 192 (noting that the believed-to-be-absent element of “value” could be
found by “more technically-literate court judges [who could] judge ‘value’ in more than
just monetary terms,” but concluding that as of yet, “[u]ntil such a shift in perception
occurs the in-game items received from loot boxes cannot be considered value”); see also
Mann, supra note 13, at 227 (concluding that “current case law and statutory definitions
are inadequate to classify loot boxes as gambling outright”); Moshirnia, supra note 116, at
99 (“Nor would loot boxes qualify as gambling if one considers the virtual items to be
worthless.”).
139
140
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box contents as things of value; in many games, those contents
are often resold for value in player-to-player transactions with
the direct sanction of the developer. This Article further argues
that the money players pay in order to purchase loot boxes
constitutes valuable consideration. The gambling determination,
therefore, turns largely upon whether a loot box contains an item
of independent value, received at random, for which the
purchaser pays consideration.147
As authors have noted,148 and as the ESRB conceded in its
own statement on the subject,149 the element of “chance” is
clearly present in opening a loot box, and as such this Article will
not further discuss it. Instead, it will engage with the stronger
argument against the presence of the element of a valuable prize
and, to a lesser extent, consideration.
B.

Valuable Prize
In order to evaluate whether a loot box’s contents have
independent value, we must consider the reasons why players
buy loot boxes in the first place. Are they seeking one or more
specific advertised items, and all other results are
disappointments? Or are they paying for a virtual lightshow,
unconcerned with the specific contents of their loot box? Industry
representatives frequently contend that loot boxes are not a form
of gambling because a loot box always gives the player
something.150 From the perspective of such advocates, the “value”
derived from a loot box transaction is the guaranteed receipt of
any one or more items inside the loot box.151 But this
interpretation assumes and disregards much. Certainly, a player
who receives a free loot box as part of an in-game promotion
might open it out of idle curiosity, or a desire to receive
something, anything. That player cannot be disappointed,
because a loot box will always give him something, whether it be
a “skin” (a recolor or texture swap for an existing in-game asset,
with no practical gameplay effects), in-game currency, a
consumable item, or any number of other possible in-game
effects152 (hereinafter referred to as “items”). But such a player
has not purchased his loot box.

See Castillo, supra note 62, at 183.
Id. at 187–88.
149 Schreier, supra note 117.
150 Id.
151 See id.
152 See Vance, supra note 3 (providing ESRB definition which states loot boxes “are
like locked treasure chests that contain an array of virtual items that can be used in the
game once unlocked.”).
147
148
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Players who purchase loot boxes are making a decision,
consciously or not, to enter into a monetary transaction.153 It is clear
that such paying players desire something from their purchased
loot boxes. The issue then becomes whether a paying player is
purchasing loot boxes for the experience of opening the loot box,154
or to seek one or more specific items.155 If one player—let’s call him
Jace—is simply purchasing the experience, a talking point adopted
by some Industry advocates,156 then he has received a guaranteed
thing of value for his purchase. Jace opened his loot box and got an
item. He got what he paid for. Ergo, the Industry proclaims, not
gambling.157
This interpretation is flawed. To illustrate: a one-dollar slot
machine that always paid out at least one penny would still
amount to gambling activity—the “guaranteed” receipt of a
nominal prize would not invalidate the larger game being played.
Further, while Jace might be finding value in the chase itself
(rather than any particular prize), this makes the practice more
akin to gambling, not less.158
But what of the other player—let’s call her Liliana—who has
no interest in most of the possible items in the loot box, and sees
them simply as chaff through which she must sift to unearth the
solitary gem that she desires? Depending on the manner in which
that particular video game is monetized, Liliana may not have
the option159 to purchase the item directly from the loot box. In
153 See Imran Khan, Loot Box Bill Officially Introduced to Senate, GAMEINFORMER
(May 23, 2019, 1:05 PM), https://www.gameinformer.com/2019/05/23/loot-box-billofficially-introduced-to-us-senate
[http://perma.cc/VMK9-QD6Z]
(quoting
text
of
unnumbered bill in U.S. Senate that defines “loot box” in pertinent part as “an add-on
transaction to an interactive digital entertainment product”).
154 See INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 127–28 (remarks of Dr. Andrey Simonov).
155 See id. at 9 (“There have been anecdotal reports of consumers spending hundreds
to thousands of dollars in pursuit of coveted items. . . . In addition, do consumers,
especially children or adolescents, adequately understand what they're purchasing and
how much time or money they're spending? Are the disclosures adequate? For example,
disclosures about the odds of obtaining specific loot box items, especially if those odds may
change depending on game behavior.”).
156 See id. at 116–17, 121–30.
157 See Moshirnia, supra note 116, at 98–99.
158 See INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 127 (“[M]aybe consumers just play loot
boxes because they get some utility from a risk. . . . And this is really problematic because
this is the same as [in] casinos, and it can lead to problem gambling, to addiction, and to
all stories like this.”).
159 It is worth noting that a prominent video game featuring loot boxes, ActivisionBlizzard’s Overwatch, adopts a hybrid model. Under this model, players receive free loot
boxes periodically for playing games and logging in, while also having the opportunity to
buy as many loot boxes as they wish through the in-game store. Any item in a loot box is
also available for purchase using the in-game currency known as “credits.” Credits cannot
be purchased directly and instead must be acquired by opening loot boxes, which pay
them out in lots of 50, 150, 200, and 500 according to the rarity of the bundle of credits
contained in a particular loot box. Duplicate items received from loot boxes award a
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that case, she must roll up her sleeves and begin to open loot
boxes, one by one, until she finds what she is looking for or
abandons her search out of frustration or economic necessity.
Liliana would have paid out real money for the mere chance to
receive what she desired. Even if she is ultimately successful, her
success could have come after opening one loot box or one
hundred. The solitary item she desired could have cost her wildly
different amounts of money. Initial research suggests that most
loot box purchasers adopt this approach, and “open loot boxes
mainly for functional value . . . .”160
One might consider the above distinction to be largely
philosophical. What do players personally value? Why should the
Industry be regulated in dealing with Liliana if they would be
free to deal with Jace? Indeed, Industry advocates have often
emphasized players’ decision to purchase loot boxes as an act of
self-expression,161 noting that often loot box contents are entirely
cosmetic and confer no gameplay advantages.162 These
arguments tend to frame the discussion around loot boxes in
terms of player agency and expression.163 The ESA laid out its
position as follows:
Loot boxes are a voluntary feature in certain video games that provide
players with another way to obtain virtual items that can be used to
enhance their in-game experiences. They are not gambling. . . . In
some games, they have elements that help a player progress through
the video game. In others, they are optional features and are not
required to progress or succeed in the game. In both cases, the gamer
makes the decision.164

prorated amount of credits as well. A “Rare” skin (featuring a simple color palette swap of
that character’s original model) for a particular character costs 250 credits to be directly
unlocked, while a new “Legendary” skin for that character (incorporating new visual and
audio effects and a more radically altered character model) will cost 3,000 credits. A
player could either choose to open their free loot boxes (augmenting them with paid loot
boxes as desired) until they got the skin they wanted, or they could use their credits to
purchase the skin directly. The purpose of this footnote is to illustrate that, even though
players can unlock skins “directly” in Overwatch, the currency to do so must be accrued by
opening loot boxes. A player attempting to acquire a limited-time skin may not have
enough time to purchase that skin directly with their available credits, and will instead
need to purchase multiple loot boxes to either find the skin by chance or accrue enough
credits to unlock it manually. See, e.g., Daniel Friedman, Want Overwatch to Get Rid of
Loot Boxes? It Might Get More Expensive, POLYGON (Sep. 5, 2018, 2:00 PM),
http://www.polygon.com/2018/9/5/17822966/overwatch-loot-boxes-skins-events
[http://perma.cc/EW2X-ZAH5] (discussing Overwatch’s in-game economy).
160 See INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 130.
161 Id. at 22 (remarks of Sean Kane).
162 Id. at 30–31.
163 Id. at 22 (“[C]ustomization in games is exceedingly popular and it’s something
that [players] do to really interact with their friends. They love to be able to show off some
sort of new element that allows their game character to more reflect their own
personality.”).
164 Hannah Dwan, Hawaii to Crack Down on ‘Predatory’ Loot Boxes in Video Games
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In evaluating the ESA’s above defense of the practice,
Professor Andrew V. Moshirnia noted the wrongheadedness of
discussing free will and choice in arguing whether a practice
amounts to gambling.165 Professor Moshirnia wrote:
Unsurprisingly, the Entertainment Software Association (ESA), a
trade association, has strongly opposed any suggestion that loot boxes
are a form of gambling. ESA has wrongly made this argument based
on the voluntary nature of the activity, rather than the relative value
of resulting items. . . . The ESA’s approach is odd as gambling
definitions do not typically revolve around volition—it is assumed that
bets do not place themselves and that a viewer can watch a race
without placing a wager.166

Further, player-agency arguments disregard the economic
value that players167 and game developers168 themselves assign to
specific items in their loot boxes.
The Industry is nevertheless hesitant to characterize loot box
contents as things of real-world value, and prefers to discuss
them as fun add-ons.169 This view is somewhat supported by the
monetization structure of some video games, in which players
cannot trade the items they receive from loot boxes—the items
are permanently associated with individual accounts.170 One
might wonder how the contents of a loot box can be things of
value if they cannot be shared, traded, or sold off. Under such a
system, one might imagine players enter into a loot box
transaction with the understanding that they are receiving
nothing of value, because they cannot sell it off and will
eventually stop playing that particular game.
This notion does not overcome loot boxes’ similarity to
traditional gambling activity for two reasons: (1) it fails to
acknowledge that many things of value cannot be shared or later
sold off, and (2) it also fails to take into account the many online
games in which loot box contents can and are traded and resold

Following Star Wars Battlefront 2 Controversy, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 27, 2017, 4:57 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/gaming/news/hawaii-crack-predatory-loot-boxes-video-games/
[http://perma.cc/AA7W-GCEW].
165 Moshirnia, supra note 116, at 95–96.
166 Id.
167 See, e.g., Joseph Knoop, The Most Expensive CS:GO Skins of 2017, PCGAMER (Nov. 30,
2017), http://www.pcgamer.com/csgo-skins-most-expensive [http://perma.cc/5CDU-BHRR].
168 See, e.g., Maddie Level, Unboxing the Issue: The Future of Video Game Loot Boxes
in the U.S., KAN. L. REV. 201, 216 (2019) (“Likewise, in games where the items contained
in loot boxes are categorized [by developers] by frequency and rarity, value is inherently
assigned to the items.”).
169 See, e.g., INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 22.
170 See id. at 69–70.
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for considerable sums of money with the direct support of the
game developer.171
To the first point: individuals frequently pay money for
services, such as haircuts and car washes, that cannot later be
re-sold or cashed out, and the benefits of which diminish over
time. That is not to say, however, that these services lack
value.172 The Industry’s logic with regard to loot boxes assumes
that the ability to trade something is integral to whether that
thing is valuable. But the Industry’s logic is faulty. It is
irrelevant whether the contents of a loot box are freely tradable,
as a court could find that the payment of cash for an uncertain,
nontransferable prize amounts to gambling activity regardless.
However, it is important to note that at least one nation, the
Netherlands, has only found gambling activity to take place
when the contents of those loot boxes are transferable as part of
real-world transactions.173
To the second point: in games where players are allowed to
trade amongst themselves, in-game items can command
real-world prices. Some online marketplaces, such as Valve’s
Steam Community Market (“Steam”), allow players to buy and
sell items from a host of affiliated games, many of which were
originally exclusively obtained from a loot box mechanism. 174
Steam places an $1800 limit on any single transaction, and
charges a five percent transaction fee.175 Individual game
developers determine whether they wish to enable player-toplayer trading through Steam’s market.176 This serves as further
evidence that many developers acknowledge in-game items to be
things of value, and directly profit from selling loot boxes to
players, knowing and intending for those players to in turn resell
the loot boxes’ contents for cash.

171 See Jeremy Laukkonen, Steam Community Market: What It Is and How to Use It,
LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/steam-community-market-what-it-is-and-how-to-useit-4586933 [http://perma.cc/T2GW-9FD8] (last updated Oct. 17, 2019).
172 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 G EO. L. J. 287, 297
(1988) (providing a helpful overview of John Locke’s labor theory of property, noting in
pertinent part that, human “labor adds value to the goods, if in no other way than by
allowing them to be enjoyed by a human being.”).
173 Loot Boxes & Netherlands Gaming Authority’s Findings, DUTCH GAMES ASS’N,
http://dutchgamesassociation.nl/news/loot-boxes-netherlands-gaming-authoritys-findings
[http://perma.cc/U64K-TPXM] (last visited Apr. 26, 2020).
174 See, e.g., Laukkonen, supra note 171.
175 Community
Market
FAQ,
STEAM,
http://support.steampowered.com/kb_article.php?ref=6088-udxm-7214
[http://perma.cc/A5D4-3P8L] (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
176 Id. (“It is up to the game developer to decide whether or not they want to
participate in the Community Market.”).
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Evidence that players themselves assign value to these
in-game items can be found in the steep prices they are often willing
to pay for them. For example, players of Counter-Strike: Global
Offensive (a first-person shooter game with military themes) trade
skins for the guns they use in ordinary gameplay.177 Some of the
rarer skins, originally obtained through a loot box mechanism, have
commanded staggering prices; in one extreme case, a skin called
“Dragon Lore” sold for $61,000.178
That is not to say that players are arbitrarily finding value
in particular items despite game developers’ best intentions;
developers themselves are well aware that certain items are
more highly sought-after than others, and indeed engineer them
to be as such. The manner in which they advertise these rarer
items, such as releasing promotional videos highlighting
particular items and emphasizing their time-limited nature,179
suggests that developers intend players to urgently seek out
these items in particular. Furthermore, developers entirely
control the scarcity of a particular item by setting the percentage
chance of a particular item appearing in any given loot box 180
(known colloquially as the “drop rate”181). These drop rates can be
variable, and where variable, can lead to complicated payout
structures.182 By setting certain items to have a lower drop rate
177 Andy Chalk, CS:GO ‘Dragon Lore’ AWP Skin Sells for More than $61,000,
PCGAMER (Jan. 31, 2018), http://www.pcgamer.com/csgo-dragon-lore-awp-skin-sells-formore-than-61000 [http://perma.cc/RNR8-VNHF].
178 Id.
179 See, e.g., PlayOverwatch, Overwatch Seasonal Event Lunar New Year 2020,
YOUTUBE
(Jan.
16,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eLnET-0CI4M
[http://perma.cc/PTN7-D6TQ].
180 See INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 33, 49.
181 See id. at 49.
182 To illustrate the complexity that can be involved in the implementation of a
particular variable-rate loot box mechanic, refer to the example below.
In Nintendo’s free-to-play mobile game, Fire Emblem Heroes, new collectible items (in this
case fantasy characters to be added to a player’s “barracks”) are introduced into the game
at regular intervals, often in sets of three or four. Those characters are advertised as
being available in a particular loot box (referred to in this game as a “banner”). New
characters often boast unique weapons or abilities, many of which a player can transfer to
their existing characters. A player seeking to receive one or more advertised characters
must spend in-game currency (purchased with real-world money) in order to receive a
randomized character from the banner. The chance to receive a featured character (a
“focus hero”) is 3% on most banners. Players also have a separate 3% chance to receive a
different, randomized character of the same level of rarity from a prior banner (a “nonfocus hero”). The other 94% of the time, the player will receive a randomized character of
a lower rarity from throughout the game’s history. Fire Emblem Heroes tracks whether or
not a player has received a high-rarity character, and gradually improves the rate at
which the rarest characters are available (referred to colloquially as the “pity rate”) in
increments of 0.25% for every five characters received without receiving a character of the
highest rarity, resetting to 3% for both focus heroes and non-focus heroes once one or the
other has been obtained. This creates an incentive for a player to continue to continue to
spend as their pity rate increases and the opportunity to receive their desired prize
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than other items (essentially making those items more “rare”),
game developers are tacitly acknowledging that they expect some
items to be more desirable or useful to their players. For these
reasons, it is disingenuous to claim that monetary value is not
often assigned to loot box items, or that particular items are not
more highly valued than others.
One author concluded that the “prize” element would be found
lacking in United States courts, based upon a two-pronged
analysis.183 In the first prong, the author relied in part on the fact
that games made by Electronic Arts (“EA”) and Activision-Blizzard
contained terms of service that expressly forbade account trading.184
The author discussed the case of Kater v. Churchill Downs
Incorporated,185 noting that an item that merely extended gameplay
did not constitute sufficient value to meet the definition of
gambling,186 and further that a game company could not be held
responsible for real-world trading enabled by third parties in
violation of the game’s terms of service.187
In Kater, a player attempted to bring a class action suit
against the operators of a virtual casino, seeking recovery under
a Washington state lost-gambling-funds statute, the Washington
Consumer Protection Act, as well as an unjust enrichment claim
against the casino.188 Gameplay required users to purchase and
spend virtual chips to extend their time in the virtual casino. 189
While the game included a feature allowing users to transfer
their chips to other players, the game only allowed players to do
so gratuitously.190 Nevertheless, a secondary market existed,

improves. Starting a “summoning session” (the term the game uses to describe the loot
box mechanism through which players acquire characters) costs five “orbs,” the in-game
currency. The player then may choose from one of five doors, which are color-coded among
four possible colors (red, green, blue, and gray) in order to indicate, broadly, what type of
weapon that character uses. Players seeking a particular character will know that
character’s weapon color, which is advertised in advance, and can select the corresponding
door. The door is then opened, and the player receives a character of the chosen weapon
color. The player may then choose to continue opening the remaining four doors (for a
cumulative cost of 20 orbs if all five doors are opened) or may abandon the summoning
session. Three orbs can be purchased via the Google Store at any time for $1.99. Orbs are
available in other quantities, up to a bundle of 143 (including 33 “bonus” orbs) for $74.99.
See Jason Venter, Understanding Fire Emblem Heroes: A Beginner’s Guide, POLYGON
(Feb.
8,
2017,
10:30
AM),
https://www.polygon.com/fire-emblem-heroesguide/2017/2/8/14541874/rewards-base-maps-difficulty-battle-dying-summoning-ritualteams-merge-arena-heroes-tower-quests.
183 See Castillo, supra note 62, at 189–92.
184 Id. at 190.
185 Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175049 (W.D. Wash. 2015).
186 Castillo, supra note 62, at 191.
187 Id.
188 Kater, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175049, *1.
189 Id. at *2.
190 See id. at *3.
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whereby players would trade for gameplay-extension chips, using the
in-game transfer feature to finalize the transaction after a deal had
been struck.191 Prior to playing any digital games, the plaintiff
accepted the terms of use on the casino’s website, which expressly
“state[d] that virtual chips have no monetary value and cannot be
exchanged ‘for cash or any other tangible value.’”192 The plaintiff had
purchased and subsequently lost over $1,000 worth of these
gameplay chips prior to bringing suit.193 The district court dismissed
the complaint with prejudice, finding that because the terms of
service expressly forbade transferring the gameplay-extension chips
for value, the defendant “[did] not award something of value
satisfying the requisite prize element, and therefore the game [was]
not ‘illegal gambling’ under Washington law.”194 The author based
his determination that loot box contents could not constitute things of
value partly on this lower court ruling.195 Ultimately, however, the
appellate court reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the
gameplay-extension chips were, in fact, a “thing of value,” and
concluding “that Big Fish Casino falls within Washington’s definition
of an illegal gambling game.”196 The author’s argument as based
upon Kater is therefore unconvincing.
With regard to real-world trading bans under a game’s terms
of service, the decision on the part of some game developers to
forbid real-world trading of accounts (and therefore the items
associated with them) does not necessarily eliminate the
real-world monetary value of those items to the players holding
them. A player with no intention of selling their account can still
be enticed by an attractive advertised item into purchasing a loot
box in the hopes of acquiring the item. Their inability to
(lawfully) trade that item does not negate that item’s value to the
player, which could very well constitute a “prize” sufficient to
meet most definitions of gambling. Furthermore, the author did
not acknowledge the existence of authorized online marketplaces,
such as Steam, where players are free to trade items with other
players for real-world money and in full compliance with a
game’s terms of service. For these reasons, this prong of the
author’s analysis is not convincing.
In the second prong, the author cited the case of
Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox International197 to further support his
Id.
Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc., 886 F.3d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 2018) (appellate court
ruling reversing district court opinion).
193 Id.
194 Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175049, *12.
195 See Castillo, supra note 62, at 192.
196 Kater, 886 F.3d at 788.
197 Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, 300 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2002).
191
192
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view that U.S. courts would fail to find prize value in a loot box’s
contents.198 Chaset concerned a Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) suit by “purchasers of
[physical] trading cards” against the manufacturers of those
cards, who distributed them at random in manufacturer-sealed
booster packs.199 At issue was the disappointment consumers felt
in failing to obtain desirable “chase” cards, and whether that
disappointment rose to the level of an injury to property. 200 The
Ninth Circuit in Chaset dismissed the case for lack of standing,
noting that the plaintiffs lacked an injury to property. 201 In
pertinent part, the Ninth Circuit wrote:
At the time the plaintiffs purchased the package of cards, which is the
time the value of the package should be determined, they received
value—eight or ten cards, one of which might be an insert card—for
what they paid as a purchase price. Their disappointment upon not
finding an insert card in the package is not an injury to property.202

In coming to this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit appears to
indicate not that the contents of a pack of cards themselves are
worthless, but rather that they have a set value as a sealed pack,
calculated at the time of purchase and not when its contents are
discovered.203
Industry advocates have trotted out the comparison to
physical trading cards often in defense of loot box practices. 204
The argument is clear: if trading card packs under Chaset have a
value as a pack with a certain number of cards inside, and
nothing more, then loot boxes, which have a value as a loot box
with a certain number of items inside, likely have no further
value. A consumer’s expectations are not subverted when they
open the loot box and fail to find the item they desired, or so the
argument might go. But this argument fails to distinguish
physical trading cards under Chaset from the contents of loot
boxes, which differ in significant respects.
For one, the cause of action in Chaset was a RICO claim,205
not an attempt to label trading cards as a form of gambling. The

Castillo, supra note 62, at 189.
Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1085.
200 Id. at 1087.
201 Id. at 1087–88.
202 Id. at 1087.
203 See id.
204 See, e.g., INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 42 (ESA representative Mike
Warnecke claiming, “For 75 years or more, Americans have been opening up millions of
packages of baseball cards to put together their dream team, to get the players that they
root for on their home teams, and to build their collections with their friends. It’s a
common mechanic that people are very familiar with.”).
205 Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 2002).
198
199
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requirement of an injury to property is an element of a RICO
claim,206 not of a traditional gambling definition. Further, the
trading card comparison is inapposite because it fails to take into
account the velocity with which consumers can participate in loot
box transactions.207 At the 2019 FTC conference, Professor Adam
Elmachtoub explained in response to a question about the
trading card comparison:
[O]ne thing though it’s important to recognize, is there’s no friction
costs for buying loot boxes. There’s a huge friction cost for buying a
physical item. . . . So when you buy something—even if you buy it
from Amazon, you still have to wait to receive it. And by that point,
your thrill may have disappeared a little bit.208

Noted researcher Dr. David Zendle, at that same conference,
responded to Professor Elmachtoub by noting:
I remember when we were talking to the Australian Senate about
this, they sort of said, what are the differences between loot boxes and
trading card games in the real world. . . . [O]ne of the things that
seems important is the velocity and the volume with which you can
make loot box purchases. I mean, you can’t go to a shop and just buy
Kinder Egg, Kinder Egg, Kinder Egg, Kinder Egg, Kinder Egg, Kinder
Egg, Kinder Egg, Kinder Egg, but that’s what we see people do with
loot boxes.209

The above discussion between Professor Elmachtoub and
Dr. Zendle draws into sharp contrast the distinction between
physical card purchases and digital loot box buys. Whereas
physical purchases involve “friction costs,” such as taking an
item to the cash register or waiting for it to be delivered (which
represent opportunities for individuals to rethink their purchase
or, more significantly, subsequent purchases), loot boxes can be
purchased very quickly using pre-recorded credit card
information,210 large bundles,211 and even in the case of the
Google Play Store, biometrics in the form of one-touch fingerprint
purchase authorization.212 Academics have noted that,
particularly in the realm of smart phone gaming, app designers

18 U.S.C.S. § 1964(c) (2000).
INSIDE THE GAME, supra note, at 159–60.
208 Id. at 159.
209 Id. at 159–60.
210 Add,
Remove, or Edit Your Payment Method, GOOGLE PLAY HELP,
https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/4646404?co=GENIE.Platform%3DDesktop&
hl=en%20 [http://perma.cc/8GVR-8B9U] (last visited Apr. 29, 2020).
211 INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 221.
212 Nicole Cozma, Use Your Fingerprint to Authorize Google Play Purchases on
Android 6.0 Marshmallow, CNET (Feb. 26, 2016, 9:20 AM), https://www.cnet.com/howto/authorize-google-play-purchases-with-your-fingerprint-on-android-marshmallowuseyour-fingerprint/ [http://perma.cc/MR9J-EGXN].
206
207
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prioritize developing experiences that short-circuit individuals’
ability to control their own impulses.213
This cuts against the possible moralistic argument that only
gamblers are hurt by sharp practices in the realm of digital
monetization; apps are increasingly being designed to exploit
fundamental weaknesses of human psychology.214 For these
reasons, it is not appropriate to claim that the purchaser of a loot
box is in as strong a position to evaluate the value of what they
are purchasing as is the purchaser of a physical product; the
transaction far better resembles a digital game of chance than
the simple purchase of a product. A finder of fact could take the
next logical step and hold that loot box contents (whether
transferable or not) have value.
C.

Consideration
Another argument against the classification of loot boxes as
a form of gambling is the purported absence of consideration in
the transaction.215 This argument is not as strong as the
argument against the existence of a valuable prize, however,
because loot boxes are by definition available for direct purchase
using a real-life payment method.216 Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “consideration” as “[s]omething (such as an act, a
forbearance, or a return promise) bargained for and received by a
promisor from a promise; that which motivates a person to do
something, esp. to engage in a legal act.”217 Consideration is an
essential element in all contracts.218
As Industry advocates themselves are quick to point out,
players are not required to buy loot boxes to play games.219 As
such, any money a player pays in exchange for a loot box is
consideration for a single transaction, separate from the
purchase price of the game, if any.220 For this reason, it is clear
that players are paying consideration in exchange for loot boxes,
regardless of the determination of whether individual items have
value or whether there is chance involved.

See Langvardt, supra note 89, at 141–42.
Id.
215 See, e.g., Castillo, supra note 62, at 185–87.
216 See,
e.g.,
Purchasing
Loot
Boxes,
BLIZZARD,
https://us.battle.net/support/en/article/73354 (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
217 Consideration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
218 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1550 (West 2020) (“It is essential to the existence of a
contract that there should be . . . [a] sufficient cause or consideration.”).
219 INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 26 (statement of Sean Kane) (“No one is forced
to spend money in a video game that is free to play. They choose what they want to spend
and when they want to spend it and how they want to spend it.”).
220 See Castillo, supra note 62, at 186.
213
214
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One author asserted that because certain titles, such as
Overwatch and Star Wars Battlefront II, made all their in-game
items available “after a certain amount of time playing,” a
would-be plaintiff would be hard-pressed to argue that they had
risked their money on a loot box.221 This argument fails to
account for games in which loot box items are only available
through loot boxes, and cannot be received through
commensurate in-game play. Furthermore, even if items are
capable of being unlocked outside of a loot box, a player is still
paying consideration when they purchase a loot box hoping to
receive particular items immediately by random chance. The
opportunity to earn an in-game item outside of a loot box based
upon a large time investment does not diminish the cash value of
the consideration a player pays in exchange for a loot box.
Finally, as another author noted, “California courts have held
that consideration need not be paid solely for the chance to win
[in a gambling scheme]; rather, it is enough that consideration is
paid for something in addition to the chance to win a prize.”222
That author reasoned that consideration’s value is not
diminished by the guaranteed receipt of a random item from a
loot box.223
Another author raised an important note, reasoning that,
although a tech-savvy fact-finder might accept that loot boxes
meet the requisite elements of gambling, most cases would be
dismissed nevertheless on the grounds that plaintiffs lack a
particularized injury sufficient to constitute standing.224 From
that author’s perspective, loot boxes will only be treated as
gambling activity by courts when there has been “unequivocal
legislation to categorize them as such.”225 However, the objective
of this Article is not to claim that individual plaintiffs should be
able to recover their lost consideration on a case-by-case basis
(which would require those plaintiffs’ cases to survive motions to
dismiss for lack of standing). Rather, this section has attempted
to demonstrate that loot boxes are, in every meaningful sense, a
form of gambling, such that game developers should be required
to prospectively comply with existing gambling regulations.226
221
222

(1952)).

Id.
Hong, supra note 13, at 68 (citing Holmes v. Saunders, 114 Cal. App. 2d 389, 390

Id.
Level, supra note 168, at 225.
225 Id. at 224.
226 It is important to note, however, that policymakers may instead take the opposite
approach and elect to offer loot boxes and other forms of “social gaming” special
exemptions and protections. See, e.g., Erik Gibbs, Washington State’s Big Fish Could be
Off the Hook with New Gambling Bills, CALVIN AYRE (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://calvinayre.com/2020/01/30/business/washington-states-big-fish-could-be-off-the223
224
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Even if loot boxes are ultimately held to not constitute a
form of gambling, they remain susceptible to novel forms of
regulation. One possible regulatory avenue could be direct FTC
oversight over loot boxes and other microtransactions, even if it
is settled that they do not constitute gambling.227 Alternatively,
Congress or any given state could pass sweeping limitations or
outright bans to curb the practice.228 Neither of these possible
regulatory solutions require a court to hold that loot boxes
constitute a form of gambling under existing law. Despite the
fierce public-relations battle that is still raging over the gambling
determination, its disposition is not the end of the discussion.
IV. CURRENT REGULATORY MEASURES UNDER INDUSTRY SELFREGULATION
At present, loot boxes are entirely unregulated by any
federal or state statute in the United States.229 In evaluating the
current state (or lack thereof) of loot box regulation, two authors
for the National Law Review commented, “Several states,
including Hawaii, Washington, California, and Minnesota, also
introduced bills last year to regulate the use of loot boxes in
games, but all failed to pass.”230 This failure was not for a lack of
interest on the part of the legislators behind the respective bills;
Rep. Chris Lee of the Hawaii House of Representatives publicly
condemned the practice in introducing his state’s ultimately
doomed legislation, calling loot boxes “a trap” that has “compelled
many folks to spend thousands of dollars in gaming fees
online.”231 Vulnerable individuals are not the only ones falling
prey to the practice; Rep. Lee himself shared his personal
experience with the creeping cost of loot boxes while playing
Clash of Clans during his downtime, stating, “At one point, I

hook-with-new-gambling-bills/ [http://perma.cc/LSB7-TBUT] (noting that, as part of the
political backlash against the appellate ruling in Washington’s Kater case, state senators
have advanced bills to protect online casinos from gambling regulations where “players
are not able to cash out for real money”).
227 INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 107 (statement of John Breyault) (“And so to
ensure that the industry doesn’t take advantage of gamers in its efforts to continue that
profitability is an appropriate role for the FTC to take.”).
228 See, e.g., Senator Hawley to Introduce Legislation Banning Manipulative Video
Game
Features
Aimed
at
Children,
JOSH
HAWLEY
(May
8,
2019),
https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduce-legislation-banningmanipulative-video-game-features-aimed-children [http://perma.cc/P2CA-ZXZ5].
229 Steven Blickensderfer & Nicholas A. Brown, U.S. Regulation of Loot Boxes Heats
Up with Announcement of New Legislation, NAT’L L. REV. (May 9, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/us-regulation-loot-boxes-heats-announcement-newlegislation [http://perma.cc/FD6H-NGZQ] (noting, “[i]n the United States, there is no
legislation currently in place to regulate this practice”).
230 Id.
231 Lee, supra note 52.
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started buying crystals. I ended up spending a few hundred
dollars over the course of a few months.”232 He reflected that,
upon realizing what had happened and deleting the app, “there
was no value left. It’s just money that’s gone.”233
At the federal level, Senator Margaret Hassan of New
Hampshire, in responding to her constituents’ concerns,
corresponded directly with the president of the ESRB, Patricia
Vance, asking the Industry to adopt improved loot box
disclosures and to “develop best practices for developers.”234
Senator Hassan further pressed the FTC to look into the practice,
questioning nominees on their stance on the dangers posed by
loot boxes.235 The August 2019 FTC conference discussed above
was likely the direct result of Senator Hassan’s outreach.236
On the legislative front, one bill introduced in 2019 would
ban loot boxes in games directed primarily toward minors.237 The
practice would prohibit defined “pay-to-win microtransactions
and sales of loot boxes in minor-oriented games,”238 and would
further prohibit the “publication or distribution of video games
containing pay-to-win microtransactions or purchasing loot boxes
where the publisher or distributor has constructive knowledge
that any users are under age 18.”239 However, the bill has yet to
advance, and some commentators have expressed concerns about

232 Cecilia D’Anastasio, Hawaii State Rep Is Drafting Bill Barring Minors from
Buying Games with Loot Boxes, KOTAKU (Dec. 8, 2017,
4:40 PM),
https://kotaku.com/hawaii-state-rep-is-drafting-bill-barring-minors-from-b-1821136540
[http://perma.cc/26EC-WJWD].
233 Id.
234 Letter from Margaret Wood Hassan, Sen., to Patricia Vance, President of the
ESRB,
at
1
(Feb.
14,
2018),
https://www.hassan.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/180214.ESRB.Letter.Final.pdf
[http://perma.cc/G6JS-6CA4]) (regarding loot boxes).
235 Paul Tassi, US Senator Confronts the ESRB Over Loot Box Classification and
Addiction,
FORBES
(Feb.
15,
2018,
9:59
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2018/02/15/us-senator-confronts-the-esrb-overloot-box-classification-and-addiction/#73d8316e5a97 [http://perma.cc/Y28B-PUYR] (“This
week, Hassan asked four FTC nominees the question: ‘That children being addicted to
gaming – and activities like loot boxes that might make them more susceptible to
addiction – is a problem that merits attention?’”).
236 Senator Hassan Statement on Announcement that Major Video Game
Manufacturers Will Make Loot Box Odds More Transparent, MAGGIE HASSAN (Aug. 7,
2019), https://www.hassan.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-hassan-statement-onannouncement-that-major-video-game-manufacturers-will-make-loot-box-odds-moretransparent [http://perma.cc/JDC7-HMDL] (“The announcement was made at a loot box
workshop hosted by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which came in response to
Senator Hassan’s advocacy.”).
237 See Protecting Children from Abusive Games Act, S. 1629, 116th Cong. §§ 1–5
(2019).
238 Id. § 1(a).
239 Id. § 1(b).
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its potential overbreadth,240 while others have mocked its
chances of passage altogether.241
The ESRB, and by extension its parent entity the ESA, are
the only entities to have enacted anything resembling loot box
regulations.242 The Industry’s advocates frequently argue that
sufficient controls are already in place, and that parents need
only be educated about the tools the Industry has placed within
their control.243 In response to Senator Hassan’s communications
with the FTC, and the subsequent announcement that the FTC
would be hosting an exploratory panel in August 2019, ESA
president Stanley Pierre-Louis noted, “We look forward to
sharing with the senator the tools and information the industry
already provides that keeps the control of in-game spending in
parents’ hands. . . . Parents already have the ability to limit or
prohibit in-game purchases with easy to use parental controls.”244
Such arguments imply that no further regulation is necessary,
only education.245
Despite purporting to engage in self-regulation, the
Industry’s advocates and representatives frequently disregard
suggested regulatory changes by relying on their blanket
assertion that loot boxes are not gambling.246 At the 2019 FTC
workshop, an audience question about whether the Industry
would seek to connect affected players with resources similar to
Gamblers’ Anonymous was met with the following response from
panelist Mike Warnecke of the ESA: “So, no, it does not include
any sort of hotline for that. ESA’s position is that loot boxes are
not a form of gambling and that it wouldn’t be an appropriate
solution to that issue.”247
240 Owen S. Good, Anti-Loot Box Bill Poses a Real Threat to Sports Video Games,
POLYGON (June 1, 2019, 7:32 PM), https://www.polygon.com/2019/6/1/18648907/anti-lootbox-law-congress-josh-hawley-senate-nba-2k-fifa-ultimate-team
[http://perma.cc/6Q7Z38NL].
241 Giancarlo Valdes, ‘Zero’ Chance It Passes: Game Analysts Break Down Senator’s
Anti-Loot
Box
Bill,
VENTUREBEAT
(May
13,
2019,
11:35
AM),
https://venturebeat.com/2019/05/13/zero-chance-it-passes-game-analysts-break-downsenators-anti-loot-box-bill/ [http://perma.cc/N5TX-HQQS] (One securities analyst
lambasted the bill, arguing, “Congress simply cannot legislate against pay-to-win, where
a game is competitive and people purchase better weapons, gear, etc. . . . That’s like
legislating against faster cars, nicer handbags, whatever. Too dumb to comment on.”).
242 See,
e.g.,
Parental
Controls,
ESRB,
https://www.esrb.org/tools-forparents/parental-controls/ [http://perma.cc/JG27-9VS5] (last visited Apr. 30, 2020).
243 See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 47.
244 Id. (emphasis added).
245 See INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 176–77 (reflecting ESRB President Patricia
Vance’s statement at the 2019 FTC workshop, “We want to make sure that parents know
that when they see that in-game purchase notice . . . if they want to limit their child's
ability to spend money, they know how to do it.”).
246 See, e.g., id. at 74–75 (statement by Renee Gittins).
247 Id. at 101.
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It was not until the FTC workshop was underway that the
ESRB announced that it would seek to compel its member
entities to disclose loot box drop rates to players. 248 Although the
ESRB did not impose a detailed timetable for compliance, 249
multiple panelists in attendance touted the measure as a
significant act of self-regulation.250 However, commentators have
noted that heralding the measure as an act of self-regulation is
somewhat disingenuous,251 as the measure was announced only
after China had already enacted laws mandating such disclosure
within their markets.252 Furthermore, the exact method and
specificity of odds disclosures under the mandate are unclear,
with no set standard.253 Absent a rigorous and well-defined odds
disclosure scheme, players will not be meaningfully informed of
the odds against them.254 Further, even if the Industry
committed to a measurable standard for disclosure, at present
enforcement would be entirely managed by Industry insiders.255
Keith S. White, executive director of the National Council on
Problem Gambling, stated at the FTC workshop:
And one of the things that we do a lot in the gambling industry, is we
recognize the role of parents, we recognize the role of industry selfverification, but we absolutely believe that there has to be third-party
objective regulation. Sometimes that could take the role of the—
sometimes that could be the role of the FTC. . . . It’s an important
consumer protection feature. And so if the industry is going to provide
us information on odds and randomness, take a lesson from the
gambling side, you got to get it done independently. It’s not going to be
effective if you’re just telling us, oh, trust me, this game, these items

Id. at 100–01 (statement by Michael Warnecke).
Video Game Industry Commitments to Further Inform Consumer Purchases, ENT.
SOFTWARE
ASS’N,
https://www.theesa.com/perspectives/video-game-industrycommitments-to-further-inform-consumer-purchases/ [http://perma.cc/F4B7-GL3E] (“The
precise timing of this disclosure requirement is still being worked out, but the console
makers are targeting 2020 for the implementation of the policy.”) (last visited Apr. 30,
2020).
250 See INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 75, 106, 204.
251 Tassi, supra note 122.
252 See, e.g., Nathan Grayson, China Will Force Games With Loot Boxes to Disclose
Odds, KOTAKU (Dec. 8, 2016, 11:35 AM), https://kotaku.com/china-passes-law-forcinggames-with-loot-boxes-to-discl-1789828850 [http://perma.cc/YE8Q-XYHF].
253 See Video Game Industry Commitments to Further Inform Consumer Purchases,
supra note 249.
254 Rebekah Valentine, Consumer Advocates to ESRB, FTC: Loot Box Odds Disclosure
is
Not
Enough,
GAMESINDUSTRY.BIZ
(Aug.
7,
2019),
https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2019-08-07-consumer-advocates-to-esrb-ftc-lootbox-odds-disclosure-is-not-enough [http://perma.cc/B588-CEM6] (summarizing the ESA’s
commitments after the 2019 FTC workshop and arguments stressing that while they are
helpful first steps, they are not sufficient on their own).
255 See id.
248
249
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drop at this rate, especially without any means to independently
verify it.256

Perhaps the only concrete regulation the ESRB has
promulgated in this area has been the requirement of an
“In-Game Purchases” label on games featuring loot boxes, among
other microtransactions.257 However, when initially released in
2018, the label did not distinguish between loot boxes and other,
less-controversial microtransactions in games, such as one-time
purchases of non-randomized content.258 The words “loot box” do
not appear on any ESRB ratings packaging259; it is necessary to
review the ESRB’s website to find loot boxes listed and defined,
amongst a wider list defining other types of microtransactions
such as “In-Game Currency” and “Expansions.”260 Prior to early
April, 2020, the “In-Game Purchases” label said nothing more.261
Perhaps in direct response to criticisms similar to those outlined
above, on April 13, 2020 the ESRB updated the In-Game
Purchases label to read on relevant titles, “In-Game Purchases
(Includes Random Items).”262 The ESRB noted that this new
measure was intended “[t]o provide even greater transparency
about the nature of in-game items available for purchase . . . .”263
Outlining how the new label would be implemented, the ESRB
explained:
This new Interactive Element, In-Game Purchases (Includes Random
Items), will be assigned to any game that contains in-game offers to
purchase digital goods or premiums with real world currency (or with
virtual coins or other forms of in-game currency that can be purchased
with real world currency) for which the player doesn’t know prior to
purchase the specific digital goods or premiums they will be receiving
(e.g., loot boxes, item packs, mystery awards). In-Game Purchases
(Includes Random Items) will be assigned to all games that include
purchases with any randomized elements, including loot boxes, gacha
games, item or card packs, prize wheels, treasure chests, and more.264

The article released by the ESRB announcing this new
change justified the prior exclusion of the element of

INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 191–92.
Vance, supra note 3.
ESRB To Begin Assigning “In-Game Purchases” Label to Physical Video Games,
ESRB (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.esrb.org/blog/esrb-to-begin-assigning-in-gamepurchases-label-to-physical-video-games/ [http://perma.cc/HJ3B-PDN3].
259 See id.
260 Vance, supra note 3.
261 Introducing a New Interactive Element: In-Game Purchases (Includes Random
Items), ESRB (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.esrb.org/blog/in-game-purchases-includesrandom-items/ [http://perma.cc/89E6-A4X5].
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Id.
256
257
258
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randomization from the label by noting, “According to research,
parents are far more concerned about their child’s ability to
spend real money in games than the fact that those in-game
purchases may be randomized.”265 The ESRB claimed that the
updated label, explicitly acknowledging randomization, resulted
because of outreach from “many game consumers and
enthusiasts (not necessarily parents) . . . asking the ESRB to
include additional information to identify games that include
randomized purchases.”266 Perhaps anticipating further criticism,
the ESRB directly acknowledged the lack of the term “loot box,”
anywhere in the revised literature.267 It justified the exclusion by
observing that “‘Loot box’ is a term that doesn’t encompass all
types of randomized in-game purchase mechanics. We want to
ensure that the new label covers all transactions with
randomized elements.”268 It further noted:
Moreover, we want to avoid confusing consumers who may not be
familiar with what a loot box is. Recent research shows that less than
a third of parents have both heard of a loot box and know what it is.
“Loot box” is a widely understood phrase in and around the video
game industry and among dedicated gamers, but most people less
familiar with games do not understand it. While this new label is
primarily in response to feedback from game enthusiasts, it is still
essential that all consumers, especially parents, have a clear
understanding of the rating information we provide.269

Based on the foregoing, it appears the ESRB prioritizes
cleanliness and brevity over meaningful information when crafting
on-box video game ratings—further clarification risks raising
uninformed consumers’ concerns. The fact that the ESRB has
updated the label at all suggests that it sees the need to take some
nominal action to respond to increased consumer concerns about loot
box implementation, despite the ESRB’s refusal to directly
acknowledge the practice’s similarities to traditional gambling
activity.
Apart from the Industry’s commitment to a mercurial and future
standard for loot box odds disclosure, and the (newly-updated)
In-Game Purchases label, nothing further is required of game
developers by the ESRB with regard to loot box implementation. If
this is to be the regulatory standard of the Industry’s appointed
self-regulator, it is helpful to analyze the arguments for and against
such self-regulation.

265
266
267
268
269

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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V. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION
The Industry’s struggle for self-regulation was hard-won.
Public outrage had been building against the Industry in the
early 1990s,270 as concerned parents turned their attention from
explicit music to explicit video game content.271 In particular, a
street-fighting game called Mortal Kombat and a Sega game
entitled Night Trap raised concerns about the effects of violent
and sexual content in these games on video game-playing
minors.272 Senators Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut and
Herbert Kohl of Wisconsin brought the issue to the attention of
Congress, and held contentious hearings where the publishers of
these titles were forced to justify the publication of these
games.273 Senator Lieberman introduced the Video Game Rating
Act of 1994, which threatened to unilaterally establish an
Interactive Entertainment Rating Commission.274 Senator
Lieberman’s purpose in introducing the Act was to show the
government’s hand and encourage the Industry to take
responsibility for its own regulation instead.275 Senator
Lieberman directly warned the Industry to that effect during one
such hearing, advising, “The best thing you can do, not only for
this country, but for yourselves, is to self-regulate. And believe
me, it’s not only going to be important to our kids, it’s going to be
important to the ultimate credibility and success of your
business.”276
As a direct result of sustained public and political pressure,
and with the sword of the Video Game Rating Act dangling
overhead,277 the ESA (then called the Interactive Digital
Software Association) founded the ESRB in 1994.278 The ESRB
developed a three-part rating system, with multiple content
descriptors, “after consulting a wide range of child development
and academic experts, analyzing other rating systems, and

270 Tiffany Hsu, When Mortal Kombat Came Under Congressional Scrutiny, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/business/video-gamesviolence.html [http://perma.cc/PX5Y-674Z].
271 Charlie Hall, A Brief History of the ESRB Rating System, POLYGON (Mar. 3, 2018,
12:00 PM), https://www.polygon.com/2018/3/3/17068788/esrb-ratings-changes-history-lootboxes [http://perma.cc/RC7P-UCCW].
272 Hsu, supra note 270.
273 Id.
274 Video Game Rating Act of 1994, S. 1823, 103rd Cong. §§ 1–5 (1994).
275 Gaming Historian, The Creation of the ESRB – Gaming Historian, YOUTUBE
(Sept.
23,
2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wv3HDVd22P8
[http://perma.cc/8LB2-QFGU].
276 Id.
277 See id.
278 Our History, supra note 48.
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conducting nationwide research with parents.”279 ESRB content
rating is voluntary for game developers,280 although all major
console manufacturers281 and multiple big-box stores282 require
affiliated games to go through the rating process.
The ESRB has developed standardized ratings and
enforcement guidelines for all its member entities’ video
games.283 Senator Lieberman has since hailed the ratings entity,
claiming, “I have long said that the ESRB ratings are the most
comprehensive in the media industry. There are many
age-appropriate games that are clever and entertaining. Parents
should understand and use the ratings to help them decide which
video games to buy for their families.”284 Authors have applauded
the success of the ESRB’s regulatory oversight in working to
inform parents and consumers generally of the content of video
games.285
Long having been the target of calls for “politically-opportune
overregulation,”286 the Industry is perhaps rightly fearful of the
imposition of government oversight.287 One of the strongest
arguments for Industry self-regulation is that it wards off
government censorship.288 At the 2019 FTC workshop, Renee Gittins
of the International Game Developers Association shared the
perspectives of two of her fellow game developers, one supportive of
regulation, the other opposed.289 The opposing perspective provided,
“I do not think it is the government’s role to regulate. It should be the
industry and consumers that do. It could be a slippery slope that
could lead to game censorship since the gaming industry has and will
always be an easy scapegoat.”290 Ms. Gittins emphasized the
279 Frequently Asked Questions, ESRB, https://www.esrb.org/faqs/#how-was-therating-system-created [http://perma.cc/3SES-Z4Z3] (highlighting relevant text viewable
under the “How was the rating system created?” drop-down menu) (last visited May 3,
2020).
280 Id. (highlighting relevant text viewable under the “Are all games required to have
a rating?” drop-down menu).
281 Id.
282 Gaming Historian, supra note 275.
283 Ratings
Process,
ESRB,
https://www.esrb.org/ratings/ratings-process/
[http://perma.cc/7F5T-DGTY] (last visited May 3, 2020).
284 Senators Hillary Rodham Clinton and Joe Lieberman Join ESRB To Launch
Nationwide Video Game Ratings TV PSA Campaign, ESRB (Dec. 7, 2006),
https://www.esrb.org/blog/senators-hillary-rodham-clinton-and-joe-lieberman-join-esrb-tolaunch-nationwide-video-game-ratings-tv-psa-campaign/ [http://perma.cc/9369-8Q4B].
285 See, e.g., Kishan Mistry, P(l)aying to Win: Loot Boxes, Microtransaction
Monetization, and a Proposal for Self-Regulation in the Video Game Industry, 71 RUTGERS
L. REV. 537, 570 (2019).
286 Moshirnia, supra note 116, at 113.
287 INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 74 (statement of Renee Gittins).
288 See id.
289 Id. at 73–74.
290 Id. at 74.
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Industry’s concerns about possible creative restrictions outside
regulation could impose, adding that “game developers are worried
about heavy-handed regulation hurting the game industry and their
creativity.”291
The video game industry’s self-regulatory body has been
favorably compared to the Motion Picture Association of America
(“MPAA”) with regard to its ability to preserve the First
Amendment rights of the Industry.292 The MPAA (originally the
Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America, or
MPPDA) “was established in 1922 by the major Hollywood
production studios in response to increasing government
censorship of films, which arose in turn from a general public
outcry against both indecency on the screen and various scandals
involving motion-picture celebrities.”293 The Agency enabled
Hollywood to censor itself and stave off mounting calls for
government intervention to police morality in films.294 The
Agency’s website notes, “Since that time, the MPA has served as
the voice and advocate of the film and television industry around
the world, advancing the business and art of storytelling,
protecting the creative and artistic freedoms of storytellers, and
bringing entertainment and inspiration to audiences
worldwide.”295
However, comparisons of the ESRB to the MPAA are
fundamentally flawed. Loot box criticisms have everything to do
with the monetization of video games; they have nothing to do
with the content of video games.296 Hypothetically, two nearly
identical games could be released, with the same title,
characters, plot, and gameplay. One version of the game would
not feature loot boxes and would have all of its content freely
available upon purchase of the full game. The other version of the
game would include loot boxes, with certain in-game items and
effects gated behind the mechanism. Only the second game would
run afoul of the criticisms levelled against loot boxes. The
creative and expressive content of a video game has nothing to do
with loot box functionality; it is how that content is parceled-out
and subdivided by loot boxes that raises consumer concerns. It is
disingenuous to claim that the government would be regulating
Id. at 74–75.
Mistry, supra note 285, at 569.
The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, Motion Picture Association of America,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/topic/MotionPicture-Association-of-America [http://perma.cc/9LTZ-GN62].
294 See id.
295 Who We Are, MOTION PICTURE ASS’N, https://www.motionpictures.org/who-we-are/
[http://perma.cc/U97Z-MHWB] (last visited May 7, 2020).
296 See Mistry, supra note 285, at 575.
291
292
293
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the speech or content of a video game by regulating how loot
boxes are implemented; the government would only be regulating
how that game was monetized.
Furthermore, the external regulation of loot boxes would not
render the ESRB moot. The ESRB continues to perform its
function, and it performs it well: rating the content of video
games to keep consumers informed.297 As one author pointed out,
“Senator Hassan is correct in noting that further research on
monetization mechanics is necessary to guide regulatory efforts.
But the ESRB is not best-equipped to handle such a task. The
ESRB’s function is to review gaming content for such features as
age-appropriateness, violence, graphic language, and nudity.”298
Based on that logic, the ESRB is arguably overstepping its
authority by inserting itself into the gambling determination.
The manner in which a game is monetized is simply not a
creative concern, and government oversight of monetization
would pose no credible danger of censorship.
However, not all who agree that the ESRB should recuse
itself from the regulation of loot boxes agree as to the appropriate
next step. That same author went on to argue, “Instead of
expanding the ESRB’s role, the industry should have a separate
self-regulatory organization whose sole purpose is to investigate
deceptive monetization techniques, publish guidelines, and
enforce compliance.”299 But such a step would only be a
half-measure; the newly-formed Industry entity would be just as
susceptible to Industry influence and suffer from the same
fundamental conflict of interest to which the ESRB is
vulnerable.300 Industries’ self-regulation with regard to
creativity, as is the case with the MPAA, helps to safeguard those
industries’ First Amendment rights.301 However, allowing the
Industry to be the sole arbiter of whether its monetization
methods are fair, ethical, or legal is the height of folly. It is
critical to note that the ESRB exists to protect the Industry from
outside regulation, not to protect the public from the Industry.302
It is the equivalent of leaving the proverbial fox to run the
henhouse.
See id.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
299 Id.
300 See Brendan Sinclair, Why is the Grand Theft Auto CEO Also Chairman of the
ESRB?,
GAMESINDUSTRY.BIZ
(Mar.
18,
2015),
https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2015-03-18-why-is-the-grand-theft-auto-ceo-alsochairman-of-the-esrb [http://perma.cc/9YE9-DJ53] (noting that the CEO of game company
Take-Two Interactive is simultaneously the chairman of the ESRB).
301 See Mistry, supra note 285, at 569.
302 See, e.g., Tassi, supra note 49.
297
298
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The Industry has consistently failed to act in good faith with
regard to consumer concerns about loot boxes.303 Indeed, the
Industry’s refusal to recognize the negative effects of loot boxes,
even in the face of mounting evidence, amounts to bad faith
conduct. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “bad faith” as
“[d]ishonesty of belief or purpose.”304 The Industry has responded
to public concerns about the negative psychological effects of loot
boxes with persistent skepticism305 and condescension306 that
betrays such a dishonesty of belief. At the FTC workshop, where
an International Game Developers Association (“IGDA”)
representative read out both a pro- and anti-regulation
statement prepared by two of her peers, the pro-regulation
statement provided, “Unfortunately, it seems that the industry is
having trouble being ethical when there’s profit to be made. If
someone cannot be trusted to not exploit someone else, then we
must place down a regulation to protect others.”307 While the
IGDA representative repeated the anti-regulation statement “[i]n
summary,” she did not acknowledge her pro-regulation peer’s
statement beyond simply reciting it.308 While the IGDA
spokesperson is only an individual and does not speak for the
Industry as a whole, her selective deafness speaks to a pattern on
the part of Industry advocates, a pattern of willfully disregarding
valid criticisms of the practice of using loot boxes.309
The ESRB’s decision to add the “(Includes Random Items)”
label came only after two years of sustained criticism that the
original label insufficiently notified purchasers of the presence of
loot boxes—even then, the ESRB minimized consumers’ concerns
about loot boxes specifically.310 Further, the Industry refuses to
meaningfully respond to criticism in this area, a practice perhaps
best illustrated by the frequency with which its advocates refuse
to engage in a discussion over loot boxes. In one instance, EA’s
See, e.g., Patrick Kobek, ESRB Adds New Label for Loot Boxes (It’s About Time),
(Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.thegamer.com/esrb-adds-new-label-loot-boxes/
[http://perma.cc/2QRV-8KVE].
304 Bad Faith, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
305 See, e.g., Zendle & Cairns, supra note 7.
306 MBMMaverick, Seriously? I Paid 80$ to Have Vader Locked?, REDDIT (Nov. 12,
2017,
5:36
PM),
https://www.reddit.com/r/StarWarsBattlefront/comments/7cff0b/seriously_i_paid_80_to_h
ave_vader_locked/dppum98/ [http://perma.cc/9856-NDQ6] (showing the EA’s community
management Reddit account’s response to a player loot box complaint by claiming, “The
intent is to provide players with a sense of pride and accomplishment for unlocking
different heroes.”).
307 INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 73–74 (statement of Renee Gittins).
308 Id. at 74.
309 See, e.g., Tassi, supra note 49.
310 See Introducing a New Interactive Element: In-Game Purchases (Includes Random
Items), supra note 261.
303
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Vice President of legal and government affairs claimed at a
hearing of the United Kingdom’s Parliament that Star Wars
Battlefront II’s randomized purchases were not loot boxes, “but
rather ‘surprise mechanics.’”311 He further claimed, despite the
increased economic costs loot boxes impose on players, that
players actually enjoy the experience, stating, “We do think the
way that we have implemented these kinds of mechanics . . . is
actually quite ethical and quite fun, quite enjoyable to people.”312
By failing to even acknowledge loot boxes as loot boxes, or
recognize their wild unpopularity amongst players,313 members of
the Industry have effectively stalled meaningful conversation on
the subject. When a Reddit user complained about paying a
purchase price of $80 for Star Wars Battlefront II, only to have
Darth Vader locked behind a loot box, the EACommunityTeam
account responded, “The intent is to provide players with a sense
of pride and accomplishment for unlocking different heroes.”314
That comment has since gone on to be the most “downvoted”
(disliked by unique users) post in Reddit’s history,315 with
667,826 downvotes at the time of writing, suggesting that players
did not agree with its sentiment.316 One struggles to see how
asking players to pay additional funds to unlock portions of a
game they have already purchased would instill “pride” in those
players; rather, the argument leaves the impression that the
speaker is not being forthright about its true purpose. These
incidents illustrate that the Industry is all too willing to engage
in bad faith argumentation when confronted about its
monetization practices, disingenuously claiming that the feature
is somehow beneficial to players.
The Industry’s repeated insistence that loot boxes are not a
form of gambling, even in the face of mounting evidence of its
negative impact on individuals susceptible to gambling-related
harm, further demonstrates the Industry’s disinterest in
communicating in good faith. Dr. Zendle and Dr. Cairns arguably
311 Dustin Bailey, EA: They’re Not Loot Boxes, They’re “Surprise Mechanics,” and
They’re “Quite Ethical”, PCGAMESN (June 20, 2019), https://www.pcgamesn.com/ea-lootboxes [http://perma.cc/9YGR-ZH4X].
312 Id.
313 See, e.g., Joel Hruska, Most Gamers Hate Buying Loot Boxes, So Why Are Games
Using
Them?,
EXTREMETECH
(Oct.
13,
2017,
1:02
PM),
https://www.extremetech.com/gaming/257387-gamers-hate-buying-loot-boxes-games-using
[http://perma.cc/A24G-7Z6R].
314 MBMMaverick, supra note 306.
315 Paige Leskin, EA’s Comment on a Reddit Thread About ‘Star Wars: Battlefront 2’
Set a Guinness World Record for the Most Downvoted Comment of All Time, BUS. INSIDER
(Sept. 9, 2019, 10:39 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/reddit-world-recorddownvotes-ea-star-wars-battlefront-2-2019-9 [http://perma.cc/TZ2B-CUME].
316 MBMMaverick, supra note 306.
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put the Industry on notice in 2018, when they wrote, in reporting
on a large-scale study on the links between loot box purchases
and problem gambling behavior, “[i]f loot boxes are attractive to
those with problem gambling behaviours, they pose a serious
moral question for the games companies who profit from
them.”317 They noted that the Industry did not seem to accept
such a negative narrative, writing:
However, criticism of loot boxes has been roundly rebuffed by
representatives of the games industry, with the ESRB recently
claiming that there was insufficient evidence to state that loot boxes
had negative consequences for gamers. They instead declared that “we
do not consider loot boxes to be gambling for various reasons . . . loot
boxes are more comparable to baseball cards, where there is an
element of surprise and you always get something.”318

Further evidence of the Industry’s bad faith in failing to
publicly acknowledge the harmful effects of loot boxes can be
found in its knowing reliance on revenue derived from
“whales.”319 While claiming that it cannot control the behavior of
a small addicted outgroup,320 the Industry simultaneously
accounts for the majority of its loot box-related profits from that
same small group.321 If the issue of loot box implementation is a
“moral question” as Dr. Zendle and Dr. Cairns posited,322 the
Industry appears to have given its answer.
As discussed more fully in Section IV, the Industry has
dragged its proverbial feet on each loot box regulation it has
reluctantly advanced, each only in response to an outside
stimulus and only after a significant delay. While entities such as
the MPAA impose no additional financial burdens on consumers
in performing their self-regulatory function, the same cannot be
said of the ESRB, which has turned a blind eye to the negative
impacts of loot boxes on players. External regulation of the
Industry’s monetization practices is preferable to the present
total abdication of authority to the ESRB.

Zendle & Cairns, supra note 7.
Id. (alteration in original).
See Langvardt, supra note 80, at 140.
320 See id. at 146.
321 See id. at 140; see also Aaron Drummond et al., supra note 61, at 935. (“Games
containing loot boxes appear to receive a disproportionate amount of revenue via this
mechanism from vulnerable problem gamblers, supporting ethical concerns about this
monetization method. A deeper analysis of these data casts further disquiet about loot
boxes, indicating that almost one-third of the highest spenders on loot boxes ($300+ per
month) are moderate-risk or problem gamblers.”) (internal citations omitted).
322 Zendle & Cairns, supra note 7.
317
318
319
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VI. SOLUTIONS
Rather than continue to defer to the ESRB’s authority or
encourage the Industry to set up a separate self-regulatory entity
solely tasked with regulating video game monetization
practices,323 the federal and state governments must step in to fill
the void. In 1993, Senator Lieberman threw down the gauntlet
and challenged the Industry to regulate itself or suffer
government intervention.324 In this critical area, the Industry has
had every opportunity to meaningfully regulate itself, but has
instead dragged its feet, advanced bad faith arguments, and
abdicated its so-called authority. Apps are increasingly designed
to circumvent individuals’ psychological resistance to parting
with their money,325 and in-game currencies are obscuring the
true cumulative costs of loot box purchases.326 Action is required.
Absent meaningful Industry action, it is unsurprising that
consumers have turned to their governments. Whether the FTC
takes regulatory action in response to the findings of its 2019
workshop, or state governments successfully pass bills of the sort
advanced by Rep. Lee of Hawaii,327 either result will likely cause
a sea change in the Industry with regard to loot boxes.
A.

Regulation by the Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission seeks to promote competition
and protect consumers through its regulation and enforcement
mechanisms.328 The FTC’s mission statement with regard to
consumer protection provides in part that it seeks to prevent
“unfair” and “deceptive” business practices.329 As illustrated in
Sections III and V above, loot boxes constitute unfair and
deceptive practices and are thus ripe for FTC regulation. If the
moral panics of the 1990s were sufficient to galvanize public
support for government censorship of video game creative
content, and stir the Industry to meaningful action, then the
moral justification for government intervention here is even
stronger. Before, public outrage concerned only scandalous and
violent video game content, neither of which were proven to have
lasting effects on players.330 Here, however, individuals are
Mistry, supra note 285, at 575.
See Gaming Historian, supra note 275.
325 See Langvardt, supra note 89, at 141–42.
326 See INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 62–63, 67 (statement of John Breyault); see
also Sinclair, supra note 106.
327 Lee, supra note 52.
328 What We Do, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do [http://perma.cc/UQ7PABZT] (last visited May 7, 2020).
329 Id.
330 See Kevin Draper, Video Games Aren’t Why Shootings Happen. Politicians Still
323
324
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suffering lasting economic, social, and psychological costs as a
result of loot box implementation.331
Initial investigatory steps have already been taken.332 One
year after the August 2019 FTC Workshop, the agency issued a
“staff perspective” report.333 The report reviewed the issues
submitted to the FTC at the workshop and through public
comment, distilling the key concerns of panelists and commenters
to the following points: (1) mechanics that may confuse or
manipulate consumers; (2) users feeling pressure to spend; (3) the
impact of the practice on children; (4) the manner in which loot
box odds are disclosed; (5) issues concerning in-game purchase
disclosures (i.e. in-game currency confusion); and (6) concerns
regarding whether developers could give popular content creators
loot boxes with better odds for “promotional purposes than odds
available to the general public.”334 While the FTC staff
perspective report provided an overview of possible future
regulatory measures, it emphasized the role of existing ESRB
initiatives such as the new “Includes Random Items” label, as
well as “other proposed self-regulatory measures.”335 To the
extent the staff perspective discussed dissenting views critical of
the ESRB, it merely included a section entitled “Mixed views on
increased government regulation.”336 The section briefly touched
on the idea of implementing “third-party, independent
verification of loot box odds” and hoping for “greater industry
transparency.”337 A significant portion of this section was devoted
to reiterating the Industry’s scaremongering that “poorly crafted
regulation could harm the industry and inadequately protect
consumers.”338 The document emphasized the importance of
conducting further research in this “evolving” area, highlighting
Blame
Them.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
5,
2019),
http://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/sports/trump-violent-video-games-studies.html
[http://perma.cc/2SWJ-AGLY].
331 See, e.g., Ethan Gach, Meet the 19-Year-Old Who Spent Over $17,000 on
Microtransactions,
KOTAKU
(Nov.
30,
2017,
10:00
AM),
http://www.kotaku.com.au/2017/11/meet-the-19-year-old-who-spent-over-17000-onmicrotransactions/ [http://perma.cc/BK7Z-RZ6S]; Mike Wright, Children Spending £250
on Fortnite ‘Skins’ to Avoid Being Labelled ‘The Poor Kid’ at School, Children’s
Commissioner
Warns,
TELEGRAPH
(Oct.
22,
2019,
12:01
AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/10/21/children-spending-250-fortnite-skins-avoidlabeled-poor-kid/ [http://perma.cc/QVJ6-GUCR]; Zoe Kleinman, ‘My Son Spent £3,160 in
One Game’, BBC (July 15, 2019), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48925623
[http://perma.cc/D3J2-SMUF].
332 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 107, at 1.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 3–4.
335 Id. at 6.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 Id.
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the suggestions of “some panelists” who “encouraged the industry
to share relevant video game data with researchers.”339 The
document’s conclusion, while noting the increased relevance of
the loot box discussion in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and
corresponding increased video game usage, made no
recommendations as to how to proceed.340 Rather, the FTC’s staff
stated merely that it “encourages [the] industry to continue
efforts to provide clear and meaningful information to consumers
about in-game loot box and related microtransactions.”341 The
FTC did vanishingly little to suggest any direct action on its own
part, only noting that it would “continue to monitor developments
surrounding loot boxes and take appropriate steps to prevent
unfair or deceptive practices.”342
In merely reciting the criticisms of the Industry’s behavior,
some of which suggest the Industry harbors improper motives in
pursuing this monetization method,343 while simultaneously
deferring to the Industry’s present self-regulatory measures, the
FTC has signaled its disinterest in stepping into the arena at the
present time. For reasons discussed throughout this article, this
approach is insufficient to protect consumers. It is not sufficient
to allow the Industry to continue to profit through these practices
when the FTC has acknowledged the problematic nature of loot
box odds disclosures and in-game currencies at present. A tepid
commitment to mandate some form of permanent disclosure
schedule, written by the Industry itself, at some point in the
future does nothing to protect consumers today, and little to
protect them tomorrow. Because of the FTC’s deference toward
the Industry at this point in time, consumers should look
elsewhere for protection.
B.

Regulation by State Governments
Individual state regulations may be best suited to rein in the
Industry. While a single regulatory body is vulnerable to regulatory
capture,344 a robust and varied patchwork of state laws would
require the Industry to meaningfully respond or else cease to
operate in each jurisdiction entirely. While the Industry has
Id.
Id. at 7.
341 Id.
342 Id.
343 See, e.g., INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 102 (statement of Omeed Dariani)
(“I’ve definitely been in a room where a publisher said we could do better odds on the
packs that this person opens for promotional purposes.”).
344 See Tejvan Pettinger, Regulatory Capture, ECONOMICS HELP (May 24, 2018),
http://www.economicshelp.org/blog/141040/economics/regulatory-capture/
[http://perma.cc/8UUW-UQF5].
339
340
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previously pulled entire games out of countries such as Belgium in
response to those countries’ consumer protection laws,345 such
action would likely not be economically viable for the Industry if
such a large global economy as California enacted meaningful loot
box regulations. For a prime example of a state’s power to compel
better behavior on the part of its corporate citizens, look no further
than the California Appellate Court’s position that gig economy
ride-share companies must treat their drivers as employees, rather
than as independent contractors.346 Even where companies threaten
to pull out of a state entirely,347 such a result nevertheless
vindicates the right of the state to define what practices it will and
will not accept within its borders.
Regulation of loot boxes should be no different. States can, in
response to the popular will of their residents, begin to restrict
the practice of operating a loot box scheme by passing meaningful
regulations on a state-by-state basis. States may define which
loot box practices they will accept, and which they will not.348
State regulation would also be more effective at striking the
correct balance between the interests of consumers and the
Industry, because each state can experiment with varying types and
degrees of regulatory control over loot boxes. Rather than face a
nationwide ban or potentially overbroad and burdensome federal
regulation, the Industry would instead be subjected to individual
states’ efforts to formulate the “best” form of regulation. The
Supreme Court has “long recognized the role of the States as
laboratories for devising solutions to difficult legal problems.”349

Hern, supra note 122.
See People v. Uber Techs., Inc., 56 Cal. App. 5th 266, 312 (2020) (“The trial court
found that rectifying the various forms of irreparable harm shown by the People more
strongly serves the public interest than protecting Uber, Lyft, their shareholders, and all
of those who have come to rely on the advantages of online ride-sharing delivered by a
business model that does not provide employment benefits to drivers. . . . Accordingly, we
conclude that the trial court correctly applied the law . . . .”). Although the subsequent
passage of Prop 22 in California’s 2020 general election foiled the implementation of the
rideshare driver employee classification, the California Supreme Court refused the
rideshare industry’s request to depublish this opinion. People v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,
2021 Cal. LEXIS 913 (2021).
347 See Dara Kerr, Uber CEO: We’re Looking at All Our Options if Prop 22 Doesn’t
Pass, CNET (Oct. 20, 2020, 10:03 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/uber-ceo-were-lookingat-all-our-options-if-prop-22-doesnt-pass/ [http://perma.cc/9LKU-8U3W].
348 See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146–47 (1963) (“The
settled mandate governing this inquiry, in deference to the fact that a state regulation of
this kind is an exercise of the ‘historic police powers of the States,’ is not to decree such a
federal displacement ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ In
other words, we are not to conclude that Congress legislated the ouster of this California
statute by the marketing orders in the absence of an unambiguous congressional mandate
to that effect.” (citations omitted)).
349 Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009).
345
346
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Leaving regulation of loot boxes to the states would serve that
purpose well.
For example, as the 2019 FTC conference demonstrated,
there is not yet a consensus as to how best to define and police
loot box odds disclosures, or the precise risks they pose.350 As a
result, each state’s legislature could decide how best to define the
manner of disclosure it would require, and how those odds would
be verified. Different standards could emerge, and the merits of
each could be directly compared. Each state’s efforts would better
inform the others, and over time a reasonable and comprehensive
regulatory system would emerge. When new and uncertain areas
of the law emerge and the best solution is unclear, consumers are
well-served by leaving regulation to the states.351
As a practical matter, interested consumers may have an
easier time petitioning their respective states for some form of
regulatory oversight, since they do not need to receive the
consent of legislators from the other states, as would be required
if a federal statute was to be passed. For the reasons asserted
above, the best method of achieving meaningful regulation of the
Industry would be through state-by-state regulation.
C.

Suggested Forms of Regulation
Whether the federal or state governments take the regulatory
lead, regulators should consider government-set odds-disclosure
requirements and limit-setting.
1. Odds Disclosures
As discussed in Section IV, the Industry touted its
commitment to mandate loot box odds disclosures by the end of
2020.352 But the exact Industry standards for odds disclosure
remain mercurial, and are unlikely to meaningfully advise
consumers.353 Additional problems arise when considering
dynamic odds loot boxes, where the odds of receiving the item
varies, because it greatly complicates the ability to determine
350 See, e.g., INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 66, 205, 209 (statements of John
Breyault, Ariel Fox Johnson, and Keith Whyte).
351 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“While it is doubtful that any State, or indeed any reasonable person, would argue that it
is wise policy to allow students to carry guns on school premises, considerable
disagreement exists about how best to accomplish that goal. In this circumstance, the
theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their role as
laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far
from clear.”).
352 Video Game Industry Commitments to Further Inform Consumer Purchases, supra
note 249.
353 See Valentine, supra note 254.
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whether the Industry is adhering to its published odds. 354 Even
when
the
ESRB
imposes
mandatory
odds-disclosure
requirements on all its members, no two games are likely to use
the same loot box system, which will make use of a centralized
and easy-to-understand odds disclosure schedule difficult.
Further, the Industry has a vested interest in only complying
with these disclosure requirements at the bare minimum, in the
most obtuse possible way.355 In short, two problems are currently
posed by the self-regulation initiative as it concerns odds
disclosures: (1) it does not reasonably assure consumers that they
will be meaningfully informed of the odds against them; and (2) it
leaves the Industry to police its own adherence to its standards,
with no mechanism for consumer or government oversight.
Government intervention would resolve both issues. A
government-set odds disclosure schedule could provide
uniformity across different games and mandate transparency,
rather than leaving each developer to live up to the ESRB’s odds
disclosure commitment on a case-by-case basis. As demonstrated
in gambling regulation, “self-regulation alone is never enough. It
must have an enforceable consumer protection framework and be
accompanied by external oversight, research, monitoring, and
verification by independent groups.”356 So too would meaningful
loot box regulation rely upon external verification of the
Industry’s compliance. Whereas a dissatisfied consumer
currently has little power to review the fairness of the behindthe-scenes operations of her favorite mobile game, regulatory
officials would be empowered to do so.
Further, a standardized method of odds disclosures would
prevent the Industry from developing novel and confusing payout
structures intended only to further obscure players’ chances. If all
games had to comply with a certain pre-set form of odds-disclosure,
new loot boxes could not be developed that would employ inherently
confusing probabilities for their own sake. Rather than try to cloud
the odds, developers could cultivate player engagement with them by
openly and ethically drawing their attention to them. As suggested
by Mr. Whyte at the FTC workshop: “[L]et’s find a way to make this
information in disclosures entertaining and interactive and exciting.
354 See INSIDE THE GAME, supra note 8, at 163 (statement of Adam Elmachtoub) (“So I
think that with regard to dynamic odds, I think that would be a nightmare to regulate.
Because as the odds are changing, you can never, with like just a couple samples, see if
you’re truly adhering to such odds.”).
355 See id. at 190 (statement of Keith Whyte) (“I would hate to see [odds disclosure
tables] look like what a pay table looks like for a slot machine, which is you know 2.5,
zillions of numbers in there, and without a degree in higher math, you’re utterly unable to
understand this.”).
356 Id. at 196.
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You know, build it into gameplay. Reward players for doing some
pro-social behavior, like finding out what really the odds are in this
game.”357 The Industry has the ability to better inform its players,
and from a financial perspective, has no incentive to do so currently.
Government-set and monitored odds-disclosures would remove the
tension between ethical and economic considerations in this area.
2. Limit-Setting
Another practice that could assist users in making informed
purchase decisions is the requirement of pre-commitment
limit-setting.358 Dr. Aaron Drummond wrote to the journal Addiction
on the topic of loot boxes in a letter to the editor, in which he provided
a brief overview of the controversy and expressed his concerns about
the practice’s similarities to gambling activity.359 He cited Dr. Zendle
and Dr. Cairns’s study, which indicated that problem gamblers spent
approximately $25 USD per month on loot boxes, compared to nonproblem gamblers, who spent approximately $2.50 USD in the same
time period.360 Noting the parallels between loot box spending and
problem gambling behavior, Dr. Drummond advanced precommitment limit-setting as a possible solution, one he described as a
“largely overlooked regulatory control.”361 Dr. Drummond detailed
the limit-setting process as follows:
In electronic gambling, pre-commitment limit-setting involves users
specifying (voluntarily or compulsorily), before engaging in gambling,
the maximum they would like to spend. Once reached, this limit
triggers a reminder message and a cooling-off period in which the
player is unable to gamble further. Limit setting is broadly effective at
reducing over-expenditure, and generally viewed positively by
gamblers. Our reanalysis suggests a clear need for limit-setting
mechanisms on loot boxes, because a substantial proportion (30%) of
the highest spenders are moderate-high-risk gamblers. Further
increasing the probable utility of limit-setting in this context, unlike
traditional gambling platforms gamers cannot bypass the limit-setting
restriction simply by switching to a different game—rewards are
game-specific.362

Dr. Drummond suggested a price point of $50 USD per month as
a recommended limit-setting threshold, noting that beyond that point
“the proportion of risky gamblers rises substantially . . . , implying
that this may be a functional spending cap to minimize over-

357
358
359
360
361
362

Id. at 190.
See Aaron Drummond et al., supra note 61, at 935.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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spending by at-risk populations.”363 He also discussed the option of
absolute limits on loot box spending as an alternative explored by
other researchers.364 Directly calling upon regulators, Dr. Drummond
concluded, “Policymakers would be wise to consider pre-commitment
limit-setting and other harm minimization controls used in
traditional gambling to regulate loot box spending.”365
Individuals with experience regulating gambling, such as
Keith Whyte of the National Council on Problem Gambling, have
spoken out in support of similar practices.366 At the 2019 FTC
workshop, Mr. Whyte noted:
[A]nother tip from the gambling side is self-exclusion. So one of the
most effective ways to help someone who may have a problem with
their gambling, or with their gaming use, is to allow them to selfexclude themselves. And in an environment where transactions are
monitored, you can use self-exclusion through payment mechanisms,
because while people may have many different accounts and play
many different games across many different providers and platforms,
they’re probably using that one credit card, or at least a common bank
account. And so payment level blocking can be very effective,
buttressing and adding to existing platform level controls and others.
Self-exclusion also places a priority, or that places the emphasis on
the gambler, or the gamer, and not necessarily the operator.367

Not all experts agree that limit-setting would be an effective
solution. In a subsequent letter to the editor of Addiction, Doctors
Daniel L. King and Paul H. Delfabbro critiqued Dr. Drummond’s
recommendation that limit-setting be incorporated into loot box
regulations.368 They noted:
Drummond et al. assert that limit‐setting ‘is broadly effective at
reducing over‐expenditure, and generally viewed positively by
gamblers’. While we agree that a range of harm minimization controls
should be examined, we have some reservations about proposing any
single regulatory control in isolation of other supporting measures.
Introducing a $50 limit on loot box spending, as Drummond et al.
propose, may have unintended consequences that lead to other
problems (e.g. some players may increase their playing time to
compensate for spending less money). Additionally, game designers
may find strategies to obtain revenue in other ways by introducing
other micro‐transaction features, such as features on external or
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third‐party platforms, which would create further complexities for
limit‐setting and players keeping track of spending.369

The authors did not discard limit-setting as a regulatory
measure; rather, they cautioned against over-reliance on a single
regulatory mechanism and instead recommended “undertak[ing] a
wide consultation and scoping process to develop a comprehensive
list of potential countermeasures and related consumer advice and
protections, particularly those designed specifically for gaming and
in-game purchasing, for the purpose of further review and
evaluation.”370 While they raise a valid point, the existence of other
possible consumer protection mechanisms should not foreclose the
exploration of limit-setting in the here and now. Individuals are
suffering real harm in the present; waiting to implement protections
until the best protection has been discovered will needlessly prolong
their harm. The authors’ concerns are further mitigated in light of
this Article’s recommendation that the states implement their own
regulations. By virtue of state-by-state experimentation, the best
methodology will be discovered in time, and consumer interests will
be advanced (even if only imperfectly) in the interim.
From a philosophical perspective, some might object to placing
limits upon an individuals’ autonomy by preventing them from
making a purchase they desire to make. In evaluating self-limitation
as a method of protecting the elderly from predatory lenders,
Professor Kurt Eggert engaged in an analysis of the meaning of
autonomy.371 Professor Eggert noted, “If we hold that autonomy has
intrinsic value, then to improve the lives of the elderly, we should try
to increase their autonomy.”372 He further discussed the difficulties in
maximizing elders’ autonomy, writing:
Increasing autonomy is not merely a matter of removing restraints,
for even unrestrained, a person may have so few options that she has
no real choice in what to do. Nor does merely providing more options
provide more autonomy, since the individual given the options may
effectively have no way to analyze them or determine which is
preferable. To provide the greatest possibility of autonomy, we would
need to provide a rich array of options as well as work to ensure that
the chooser has the capacity to rate and compare those options.373

Professor Eggert confronted the difficulty in determining
whether to honor an individual’s past wish to bind themselves in
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See Kurt Eggert, Lashed to the Mast and Crying for Help: How Self-Limitation of
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the present.374 He reasoned, “[t]o determine which version of the
self-limiter’s choice—the earlier decision to limit autonomy or the
later decision to revoke that limitation—is closer to being more
authentic and voluntary, the relative quality of the choice should
be examined.”375 He listed such factors as whether a “decision
was made with greater competency, more information, and
greater freedom from manipulation, coercion, or fraud, as well as
which shows a more ‘resolute intention’ to make the decision.”376
In considering the philosophical idea of “separat[ing] one’s
identity into various strands, such as a present self and various
future selves,”377 Professor Eggert theorized that, “[i]f we . . . split
the self this way, then the self-limitation of autonomy becomes,
to a significant extent, a method for the present self to bind the
future self, or for the long-term planning self to bind the self
desiring immediate gratification.”378
Reviewing the efficacy of self-exclusion programs in the realm
of problem gambling, Professor Eggert observed that self-exclusion
is a “method of providing protection from excessive gambling, while
respecting the autonomy of the problem gambler.”379 He explained
that self-exclusion programs involve self-identified problem
gamblers voluntarily signing up to “request to be personally
excluded from one or more, or perhaps all, of the casinos in the
state.”380 “The self-exclusion program,” Professor Eggert wrote, “is a
classic example of the self-limitation of autonomy as a method of
consumer protection. Like Ulysses, the compulsive gambler
recognizes that he will be unable to resist the siren call of the
casinos, and seeks a way to limit his own freedom.”381 He noted that
self-exclusion programs “also appeared useful as a ‘gateway’ to lead
problem gamblers to obtain professional counseling for about half of
those who self-excluded.”382
In evaluating the weaknesses of such programs, Professor
Eggert conceded, “[t]he greatest potential flaw of these self-exclusion
programs appears to be their unreliability, the ease with which
gamblers can circumvent them, either by going to a different casino
in a state which does not have a central registry, or by tricking the
casinos to allow them to gamble.”383 Nonetheless, Professor Eggert
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went on to conclude, in analyzing self-exclusion programs as a form
of self-limitation:
A gambler’s choice to self-exclude will, in general, likely increase
rather than decrease his overall autonomy, at least if it aids the
gambler to defeat his addiction. The amount of autonomy the gambler
gives up will likely be small so long as he honors the self-exclusion,
since he is still free in every other aspect of his life. The risk that he
may have erred in his thinking also seems small, since existing
evidence indicates that almost all those who self-exclude are problem
gamblers. Perhaps most importantly, a gambler is likely to be acting
more freely and more true to his essential self when he initially
decides to limit his autonomy, rather than later, when his compulsion
to gamble would push him to reenter a casino.384

As an example, Professor Eggert detailed the Illinois Gaming
Board’s step-by-step requirements for opting into the
self-exclusion program, and noted that “[m]ost likely, people
would put much more consideration and thought into going to a
gaming board office and self-excluding than they would to
dropping quarters into a slot machine.”385
Just as limit-setting has encouraged individual autonomy in
the gambling context, it could be similarly effective at combatting
problematic loot box purchase activity. Individuals playing a
certain game on their personal account would not be able to
circumvent the lock without opening a brand new account,
defeating the purpose of accruing rewards on their original
account.386 Professor Eggert’s concerns about traditional
self-exclusion workarounds are not entirely assuaged in video
game circles, however, because those players could go on to simply
play a different game or continue to obsessively play the game to
make up the difference.387 However, a player who encounters a
message from their past selves, displayed in game and advising
them that they have hit their pre-determined limit, will have more
of an opportunity to reflect upon their actions than a player who
does not see such a message.
While the casinos that opted out of the self-exclusion
program (i.e. the casinos that did not have a central registry of
participants) provided a venue for would-be self-excluders to
cheat their past selves and exceed their personal limits, a
government-mandated form of limit-setting would by definition
not allow disinterested vendors to “opt out.”388 Unlike
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commentators at the FTC workshop, who struggled to envision a
limit-setting scenario that could survive the perverse incentive
individual developers would have to fail to adhere to the Industry
standard,389 a government-mandated limit-setting program
would leave no room for lawful noncompliance. The Industry
would be required to adhere to limit-setting practices in all of its
loot box titles, deprived only of its opportunity to exploit
vulnerable individuals.
Professor Eggert, writing about self-exclusion practices,
considered the words of philosopher Joseph Raz: “[O]ne cannot
force another person to be more autonomous. Instead, the most
that can be done is ‘by and large confined to securing the
background conditions which enable a person to be
autonomous.’”390 By requiring video game developers to
implement limit-setting mechanisms in their loot box purchase
systems, we as a society would be providing compulsive
individuals with a better opportunity to exercise their autonomy
than currently available under the ESRB’s direction.
VII. CONCLUSION
Loot boxes are linked to problem gambling.391 Whether they
cause problem gambling or merely exploit players’ existing
tendencies,392 we as a society should not tolerate the Industry’s
attempts to monetize the practice under its sole discretion. The
ESRB has abdicated its authority by failing to advance meaningful
regulations in a timely manner, and Industry advocates frequently
engage in bad-faith argumentation to justify the practice and
disregard or deny the harm to vulnerable individuals. The
psychological and financial harm inflicted by loot boxes is real and
pervasive, and individuals and their representatives are beginning to
wake up to that fact. Both the federal and state governments have
the ability to take action, and have merely neglected to do so thus far.
Rather than wait for the ESRB to cede regulatory ground inch-byinch, consumers should demand regulatory protection by an entity
that primarily serves their own interests, not those of the Industry.
The state governments are perhaps best equipped and empowered to
act on behalf of consumers in this area. Limit-setting mechanisms
and meaningful odds disclosures could serve as powerful tools to help
these [self-exclusion] measures to be effective, it will take true commitment of leadership
from ESA, ESRB, and every developer and publisher worldwide, because if you have even
one company that chooses not to participate, that opts out, that doesn’t comply with
standards, the whole system, the foundation of the entire system is undermined.”).
389 Id.
390 Eggert, supra note 371, at 732.
391 Zendle & Cairns, supra note 7.
392 Id.
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consumers make informed purchase decisions, cutting through the
veils raised by in-game currencies and piecemeal transactions.
Ultimately, video games are here to stay. They are a beloved
pastime for millions of Americans.393 Video game developers perform
a useful role in creating these games for the enjoyment of the public,
and loot boxes help to support some of them. This Article’s goal is not
to chastise developers, nor to advocate for the outright ban of loot
boxes. Rather, this Article has attempted to peel back layers of
Industry double-talk in order to reveal the very real costs of loot
boxes and their similarities to traditional gambling practices, so that
readers can decide for themselves how best to proceed. At the very
least, perhaps a reader will think twice before hitting “Buy Now”
when purchasing a loot box in their favorite game.
The true cost could be far more than $1.99.

393

Myself included.

